The UN Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo Midterm Report under Resolution 1533, Dated June 20, 2013

The members of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo have the honour to transmit the mid-term report of the Group, prepared in pursuance of paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 2078 (2012).
Nelson Alusala
Daniel Fahey
Henry Fomba
Bernard Leloup
Marie Plamadiala
Emilie Serralta

I. Introduction

1. By his letter dated 28 December 2012 (S/2012/967), the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that he had appointed to the Group of Experts the following individuals: Mr. Nelson Alusala of Kenya (arms); Mr. Henry Fombah of Cameroon (customs and aviation); Mr. Bernard Leloup of Belgium (regional issues); Ms. Marie Plamadiala of the Republic of Moldova (armed groups); and Ms. Emilie Serralta of France (natural resources and Coordinator).

2. By his letter dated 2 January 2013 (S/2013/1), the Secretary-General appointed the sixth member of the Group, Mr. Daniel Fahey of the United States (finance). Mr. Stéphane Auvray, Political Affairs Officer in the Department of Political Affairs of the Secretariat, assists the Group.

3. Following bilateral consultations with members of the Security Council Committeeestablished pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo (hereafter “the Committee”) and concerned Member States in New York, the Group presented its investigative priorities to the Committee on 1 February 2013. The Group arrived in the DRC on 9 February and met with DRC central and provincial government authorities. Between February and May 2013, the Group visited the provinces of Katanga, Maniema, North Kivu, Orientale and South Kivu.

4. During the first part of its mandate, the Group conducted two official visits to Uganda, two official visits to Rwanda, and an official visit to Burundi. The Group also conducted official visits to Germany, Belgium, France, the United Kingdom and the United States. The Group wishes to express its gratitude to these governments for their availability and cooperation. However, the Group regrets that the Government of Rwanda did not authorize two members of the Group (its experts on armed groups and regional issues) to carry out official missions on its territory or to meet with the Rwandan delegation in New York on 29 January 2013.

5. The Group of Experts also wishes to express its appreciation to MONUSCO for its support and continued cooperation since the beginning of this mandate.

6. The Group of Experts’ role is to gather and analyze all relevant information on flows of arms and related material, and on networks operating in violation of the arms embargo concerning the DRC.

7. Pursuant to paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 2078 (2012), the Group of Experts submits the following mid-term report in fulfillment of its obligation to report to the Council, through the Committee, by 28 June 2013. The purpose of the report is: (a) To describe the Group’s mandate and methodology; (b) To define the framework of the Group’s current investigations; and (c) To highlight critical events related to the Group’s mandate which have taken place since the submission of its final report on 12 October 2012 (S/2012/843), including updates on sanctioned individuals and entities.

8. The Group used evidentiary standards recommended by the report of the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (S/2006/997), relying on authentic documents and, as much as possible, on first-hand, on-site observations by the experts themselves. The Group corroborated information by using at least three independent and reliable sources. The Group notably used eyewitness testimonies from former and current combatants of armed groups, and members of local communities where incidents took place. In addition, the Group obtained telephone records, bank statements, money transfers records, photos, videos, and other material evidence to corroborate its findings.

II- Congolese armed groups

A- Mouvement du 23 mars (M23)

9. The Group of Experts’ 2012 final report (S/2012/843) documented arms embargoviolations committed by the Government of Rwanda and by senior officials of theGovernment of Uganda, in their support of M23 rebels and their allies. As part of itscommitment to uphold the right of reply, the Group annexes to the present report a letterwritten by the Prime Minister of Uganda regarding the 2012 report findings (see annex 1). Since the outset of its current mandate, the Group has to date found no indication of support to the rebels from within Uganda, and has gathered evidence of continuous – but limited – support to M23 from within Rwanda. The Group sent a letter to the Government of Rwanda on 14 June 2013 asking for clarification about this support and looks forward to a reply.

10. In early 2013, leadership struggles between sanctioned M23 leaders Gen. BoscoNtaganda and his deputy, “Brig. Gen.” Sultani Makenga, led to a split in M23, and ultimately to military confrontations between both factions. After a period of two weeks of combat, Makenga’s troops, supported by demobilized soldiers from Rwanda, defeated troops loyal to Ntaganda on 15 March 2013. At the same time, Rwandan officials dismantled Ntaganda’s network of support and recruitment in Rwanda.  FN1

11. After Ntaganda and 788 of his loyal troops and political cadres fled into Rwanda,Makenga struggled to rebuild a weakened M23. The movement is unable to control its entire territory and suffers from poor morale and scores of desertions. FN2 During the course of the Group’s mandate, Makenga’s M23 has continued to recruit in Rwanda and to enlist demobilized Rwandan soldiers. Some Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) officers have also held meetings with M23 commanders and impeded the voluntary repatriation of M23 combatants to Rwanda.

1 See para. 16-17

2 See para. 31 and 99

Ntaganda-led M23

12. Fearing arrest pursuant to a warrant from the International Criminal Court (ICC), M23’s senior commander Gen. Ntaganda clandestinely led the rebellion from a hideout near the Rwandan border, while his deputy Makenga acted as the official leader of the movement. FN3 Ntaganda played a key role in M23 by developing a recruitment network within Rwanda and forging alliances between M23 and other armed groups. Starting in late 2012, Ntagand increasingly endeavored to control M23 and monopolized leadership positions for his loyal officers. While M23 attempted to build an image of a political movement with legitimate demands, such a movement led by Ntaganda and his officers, who are notorious for their poo human rights records, FN4 was not a credible interlocutor during the International Conference on the Great Lakes (ICGLR)-led negotiations in Kampala, Uganda.

13. Strong disagreements between Ntaganda and Makenga concerning the management of M23 eventually led to a split and subsequently to open military confrontation. Ntaganda used his network of contacts within Rwanda to support his own M23 faction. To halt Ntaganda’s activities, Rwandan authorities arrested some of the individuals who were part of this network FN5. Some Rwandan officers also provided limited material support to Makenga as hsought to defeat Ntaganda.

Divisions within M23

14. The two M23 commanders first clashed during their November 2012 takeover of Goma FN6. Ntaganda moved into the city, once it fell into the rebels’ hands, despite Makenga’s advice to not do so, according to two M23 cadres and provincial authorities. Current M23 president Bertrand Bisimwa reported to the Group that Makenga ordered his soldiers to vacate Goma following international pressure, but Ntaganda’s loyalists attempted to remain in the provincial capital. According to M23 cadres and politicians close to M23, M23’s then President and Ntaganda’s ally, Jean-Marie Runiga Lugerero, unilaterally promoted Col. Baudoin Ngaruye as a “Brigadier General,” elevating him to the same rank as Makenga to have more leverage on decision-making.

15. Following M23’s withdrawal from Goma on 1 December 2012, the leadership struggles continued. Ntaganda and Makenga clashed over the division of the goods looted from Goma (see box below), and both endeavored to appoint their officers and cadres to key positions within the M23. FN7 According to former M23 soldiers, Ntaganda bribed M23 officers to gain their loyalties and managed to mobilize a majority of M23 officers around him. Former M23 political cadres and an M23 supporter stated that Ntaganda recruited in Rwanda FN8 and maintained supporters within the RDF.

3 See S/2012/843; para.6

4 Ntaganda’s loyal officers include sanctioned individuals Col. Baudouin Ngaruye, Col. Innocent Zimurinda, and Lt Col Eric Badege, whose names were added to the 1533 Sanctions Committee List on 31 December 2012 (Badege), 30 November 2012 (Ngaruye), and 1 December 2010 (Zimurinda) respectively.

5 For more details on Ntaganda’s network, see S/2012/843; para. 30

6 Ntaganda and Makenga had already clashed following former CNDP Gen. Laurent Nkunda’s arrest in January 2009. Nkunda was betrayed by Ntaganda, who took over his position as the military commander of CNDP.

7 Ntaganda accused Makenga of receiving bribes from the Congolese delegation in Kampala to integrate in the FARDC. Ntaganda had imposed his military Aide de Camp, Col. Alex Bizimungu Masozera, as part of the M23 political delegation to receive reports of the negotiations. Col. Masozera had been instrumental in large scale smuggle of minerals in Goma before the 2012 mutiny (see S/2011/738, para. 613).

8 See S/2012/843, paras. 22-23

16. According to M23 cadres, a former RDF officer, a former M23 officer, an M23collaborator, and two Congolese politicians, Rwandan officials who had previously supported Ntaganda, and who could no longer control his network in Rwanda or his actions in the DRC, decided to sideline him from M23 and to dismantle his support in Rwanda. In late December 2012, Rwandan authorities arrested RDF Col. Jomba Gakumba, due to his close ties with Ntaganda, according to former RDF officers and an M23 collaborator. FN9 A former Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) member, two former RDF officers and a politician loyal to Ntaganda, told the Group that Bishop John Rucyahana, a Ntaganda ally in Rwanda who recruited politicians and raised funds for M23 FN10, had to stop his collaboration. The Group has sought clarification from the Government of Rwanda on the matter and is awaiting a response.

17. An RDF officer, an M23 cadre, and two M23 collaborators stated that on 10 March 2013, Rwandan authorities arrested Gafishi Semikore and Theo Bitwayiki, while they attempted to help Ntaganda from Rwanda by supplying him with small quantities of ammunition, food and medical supplies during the hostilities between the two factions in Kibumba FN11.

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M23 looted Goma

M23 engaged in extensive looting while in Goma in November 2012. M23 cadres and several politicians informed the Group that Ntaganda and former M23 president Runiga had appointed loyal M23 members to positions in the DRC customs offices at the border between Goma and Gisenyi, Rwanda, where they embezzled cash and other goods (see annex 2). On 26 November 2012, Ntaganda’s business associate Logo Kubu FN12 deposited USD 38,050 in an account with Equity Bank just across the border in Gisenyi (see annex 3). The Group hascontacted Equity Bank for furtherdetails. Ntaganda loyalist Ngaruye organized the systematic looting of Government offices and vehicles (annex 4). Officers loyal to Makenga seized one FARDC T55 tank (see annex 5), as well as an extensive stock of FARDC heavy weapons and mortars (see annex 6). A DRC government report estimates that M23-stolen goods from government offices were valued at over USD 3,000,000 (see annex 7). In April, the Group observed trucks stolen in Goma stationed in M23-controlled Bunagana, at theborder with Uganda (annex 8).

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Separation between M23 factions

18. M23 split in two factions on 28 February 2013. Ntaganda and his officers took uppositions at Kibumba, 27 kilometers north of Goma (see annex 9), while Makengamaintained control of Rumangabo, situated further north (see annex 10). Former Ntaganda loyalists reported that Ntaganda had grown suspicious, fearing arrest, and increased his own protection. Ntaganda had retained the loyalty of most of the movement’s troops, and M23 “Minister of Finance” Ephrem Bwishe told the Group that prior to joining Ntaganda in Kibumba, Runiga took with him most of the M23’s finances. Makenga retained most of the movement’s weapons and ammunition stock.

9 S/2012/843, para. 83.

10 S/2012/843, para.30.

11 Gafishi Semikore and Theo Bitwayiki were part of Ntaganda’s recruitment and support network in Gisenyi.

12 S/2011/738; para. 601.

19. The presidents of both M23 factions denied having collaborated with Ntaganda. InFebruary 2013, Bertrand Bisimwa, the president of Makenga’s M23, told the Group that M23 leaders had discovered that Ntaganda was hiding in M23-held territory. On 27 February, Bisimwa issued a communiqué accusing Runiga of offering Ntaganda “political leverage to influence decisions of the M23”, and firing him as president (see annex 11). In an interview with the Group, however, Runiga denied having allied with Ntaganda and said that he had not seen him since January 2012.

20. In late February 2013, Ntaganda attempted to prepare an escape route towards Masisi. According to an Ntaganda loyalist, a former M23 officer and a M23 collaborator, Ntaganda maintained regular contacts with ex-Congrès national du peuple (CNDP) Col. Francois Mudahunga, the FARDC 812th Regiment commander in Kitchanga. In collaboration with Mudahunga, Ntaganda sent about 50 men to prepare for his eventual escape to Masisi and to collect ammunition from the weapons caches hemaintained there (see para. 117-123).

Fight between M23 factions

21. On 28 February 2013, fighting broke out between the two M23 factions. Three former RDF officers, an M23 cadre, an M23 collaborator and a Congolese politician stated that while some Rwandan officers had ensured Ntaganda of their assistance, in reality they had decided to support Makenga.

22. Demobilized Rwandan soldiers assisted Makenga’s advance against Ntaganda. Twoactive M23 members and an M23 collaborator confirmed that groups of demobilizedRwandan soldiers had infiltrated into the DRC during the two weeks of fighting to assistMakenga. Five former M23 officers separately witnessed the arrival of small groups of men from Rwanda, who were immediately assigned specific military roles, and joined Makenga’s forces in combat against Ntaganda’s troops. FN13 The Group sought clarification about this matter from the Government of Rwanda and is awaiting an answer.

23. Makenga had a tactical advantage since he controlled most of the heavy weapons looted in Goma, as well as weapons M23 had captured during previous operations and the movement’s ammunition stock. Makenga’s commanders used a tank, a multi-barrel rocket launcher and 14.5 mm heavy machine guns to push Ntaganda’s soldiers towards the Rwandan border. According to one M23 officer, one former M23 officer and one M23 civilian member, four demobilized Rwandan soldiers assisted Makenga’s troops to operate the heavy weapons.

13 These same sources told the Group that this type of immediate assignment to military roles only takes place when the recruits have prior military or police experience, in contrast to recruits who have no experience, who are assigned to a training program.

24. Rwandan officers also fed disinformation to Ntaganda which precipitated his defeat.According to two former RDF officers, an M23 officer, former M23 officers, and anNtaganda loyalist, some RDF officers met Ntaganda in early March 2013, ahead of the final battle, and promised to support him with troops and ammunition. Former M23 soldiers who fought alongside Ntaganda reported that soldiers of the RDF Special Forces that were deployed along the border provided Ntaganda with ammunition at the outset of the fighting, which made him believe that he enjoyed RDF support.

25. Two former M23 officers and one former M23 soldier told the Group they overheard regular telephone communications between Ngaruye and RDF officers during that week, following which Ngaruye ensured his troops they would receive support from Rwanda. However, as the fight progressed, it became clear the ammunition would not come. According to three former M23 soldiers, Ntaganda’s soldiers who attempted to flee to Rwanda during the week of 11 March 2013 were caught by RDF soldiers at the border and
handed over to Makenga’s force.

Surrender of Ntaganda’s M23 branch

26. As his troops ran low on ammunition, Ntaganda fled into Rwanda. According to three loyalists, former M23 officers, and soldiers who fought alongside him, Ntaganda feared that the RDF soldiers deployed along the border would kill him. Makenga’s deputy, sanctioned Colonel Innocent Kaina, also told the Group that he had planned to kill Ntaganda. Two officers loyal to Makenga also reported that the latter had ordered his troops to kill Ntaganda.

27. On 15 March 2013, Ntaganda clandestinely crossed the border into Rwanda using a small path in the Gasizi area, with one escort. Four of Ntaganda’s troops, two politicians loyal to Ntaganda, three M23 members, and an Ntaganda family member told the Group that he reached Kigali with the help of his family, and arrived at the United States embassy on 18 March where he requested to be transferred to the ICC, without the prior knowledge of Rwandan authorities. Subsequently, Rwandan authorities arrested an individual suspected of having aided Ntaganda’s escape, and interrogated Ntaganda’s wife and brother FN14.

28. According to the ICGLR Joint Verification Mechanism, 788 individuals, consisting of 718 FN15 of Ntaganda’s troops and 70 political cadres, began crossing into Rwanda on 15 March through the Kabuhanga and Gasizi border points. About 500 troops surrendered to Makenga in the DRC on Saturday 16 March (see annex 12). RDF soldiers disarmed Ntaganda’s troops who entered Rwanda. In a letter to the Group in April 2013, the Government of Rwanda confirmed that “upon their arrival on the territory of Rwanda, all M23 combatants were disarmed”. According to Rwandan authorities, the combatants handed over a total of 409 arms, including 333 sub-machine guns (see annex 13).

14 In 2012, Ntaganda’s brother facilitated the travels of recruits through Ntaganda’s hotel – Bushokoro – in Kinigi, Rwanda. See S/2012/843 para. 22.

15 This figure has also been reported by a foreign diplomat to the Group and by the Kigali-based New Times in an article on 18 March 2013.

29. Ntaganda’s M23 faction that crossed the border into Rwanda from 15 to 16 Marchincluded five sanctioned individuals. While Ntaganda was transferred on 22 March 2013from Kigali to the ICC in the Hague, on 1 April 2013 the Rwandan authorities relocated  Runiga, Ngaruye, Col. Innocent Zimurinda and Col. Eric Badege to Ngoma, about 300 km
away from the DRC border. The DRC authorities have issued arrest warrants for thesesanctioned individuals. On 22 March 2013, the Group visited the former M23 members in Rwanda. Rwandan officials shared with the Group a list of 509 of the 788 individuals who crossed into their territory (see annex 14).

30. Based on the accounts of former M23 officers and M23 medical personnel, the Group estimates that over 200 combatants from both factions died during the fighting. The same sources reported over 50 injured on the Makenga side, and that some of the injured on Ntaganda’s side were executed on Ntaganda’s orders (see para. 141). Rwandan authorities told the Group that of the Ntaganda loyalists who crossed into Rwanda, 159 were injured.

Makenga-led M23

31. After Ntaganda’s defeat, Makenga remained with a weakened M23 of some 1,500soldiers spread out over an area of 700 square kilometers. From 20 March to 19 June 2013, a total of 349 M23 combatants surrendered to MONUSCO DDRRR and many others have surrendered to the FARDC or fled. Moreover, M23 has lost the support of leaders and communities which had supported Ntaganda in northern Rwanda, and stopped benefitting from the recruitment and financial networks he had established. Troop shortages forced Makenga to vacate several M23 positions, opening the way to incursions of the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) and Nyatura into M23-held areas (see annex 15).

32. Makenga has attempted to increase the movement’s strength through recruitment in DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda. Thanks to assistance from some sympathetic Rwandan officials, Makenga has been able to recruit in Rwanda, but Ugandan officials have thwarted several M23 attempts to recruit on their territory. Despite recent recruitment, M23’s failed attempt at the end of May 2013 to recover a key FARDC position near Goma illustrates the movement’s current inability to carry out large-scale coordinated military operations. M23 prepares new military operations

33. After Ntaganda’s M23 faction was dismantled, negotiations between the Government of the DRC and Makenga’s M23 resumed in Kampala in June 2013. However, while Makenga promised his soldiers that they would be integrated into the FARDC after defeating Ntaganda, eight former M23 soldiers interviewed by the Group indicated that Makenga planned a new attack on Goma.

34. Subsequent to the adoption on 28 March 2013 of Security Council resolution 2098 (2013) authorizing the deployment of a Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) to neutralize and disarm Congolese rebels, M23 leaders addressed letters to Member States contributing troops to the FIB (South Africa, Tanzania) to dissuade them from sending their troops to the DRC (see annex 16).

35. According to former M23 soldiers, M23 held military training sessions in April and May 2013, which included training on urban warfare and guerilla techniques to defend against the FIB. Current and former M23 members informed the Group that on 27 May 2013, all M23 political cadres attended a one-week training session in leadership and management, during which the rebels apportioned key administrative functions in the event of a recapture of Goma.


36. The Group notes that M23 recruitment in Rwanda has decreased since the dismantling of Ntaganda’s recruitment network; community leaders in northern Rwanda who supported Ntaganda have ceased collaborating with the M23. However, an active M23 political cadre, former M23 officers, and local leaders reported that since the end of March 2013, M23 has recruited approximately 200 new recruits, some of whom came from refugee camps in Rwanda, while others – including children – were recruited in Rutshuru and Masisi territories in the DRC. The M23 also attempted to recruit in refugee camps in western Uganda (see para. 39).

37. Since mid-February 2013, the Group has interviewed 66 surrendered M23 officers and soldiers, including 23 Rwandan nationals. Between 1 January and 9 June 2013, theMONUSCO DDRRR section had demobilized and repatriated 57 former M23 soldiers who declared they were Rwandan nationals.16 However, during its May 2013 visit to Mutobo, the DDRRR demobilization camp in Rwanda, a camp official told the Group that no former M23 combatants had ever arrived at the base.

38. Fourteen former M23 soldiers told the Group that Rwandan nationals who deserted M23 and tried to return directly to Rwanda, were forcibly returned to M23 by RDF officers. Amongst the 14, the Group spoke to two soldiers who had themselves been forced back to M23 in DRC by RDF soldiers. One of the two soldiers had fled to Rwanda alongside four other M23 soldiers in March. The soldier said his group was immediately brought back to the DRC border by RDF soldiers and handed over to M23 commanders, who imprisoned them at Rumangabo. The other M23 soldier told the Group he fled from M23 in January and was arrested in Rwanda by RDF officers and sent back to M23. In April, another former M23 soldier witnessed RDF soldiers bringing a group of 10 soldiers back to Makenga after they had attempted to flee to Rwanda.

39. M23 has also been recruiting in Uganda on a limited scale. The Group interviewed three Ugandan citizens who had been recruited in Kampala by an M23 agent called Mufuruki in May 2013 and subsequently escaped. Mufuruki had promised them lucrative jobs in the DRC. Upon their arrival at the Bunagana border post, they were handed over to another M23 agent named Mr. Kazungu who ferried them across the border into Congo and delivered the to M23 commanders. The commanders threatened to shoot the recruits when they protested. Ugandan officials told the Group that on 7 May 2013, they arrested seven individuals suspected of recruiting for M23. In June 2013, six Ugandan nationals deserted M23 and surrendered to MONUSCO DDRRR.FN16 During the same period, DDRRR also repatriated 1 Ugandan and 1 Kenyan nationals who surrendered from M23.

Infiltration of demobilized Rwandan soldiers

40. In 2013, M23 has enlisted demobilized Rwandan soldiers in its ranks. FN17 Three former RDF officers, ten former M23 soldiers, and five former M23 officers reported that M23 agents recruit demobilized soldiers in Rwanda. Since February, the Group interviewed threedemobilized Rwandan soldiers who reported that RDF officers sympathetic to M23 had recruited them. According to three former RDF officers, an M23 collaborator, and a M23 current member, RDF officers sympathetic to M23 have facilitated M23’s recruitment inside Rwanda by asking senior demobilized officers at the district level to work with local chiefs to enlist demobilized RDF soldiers for M23. Former RDF officers, an M23 cadre, and a former M23 officer told the Group that M23 recruited both former RDF and former FDLR soldiers in Musanze and Rubavu.

41. Since March 2013, former M23 officers reported to the Group that demobilized soldiers joined M23 in discreet groups of 5 to 30 individuals which were also sighted by local leaders from the Chanzu and Kabuhanga areas. Once in M23-held territory, these recruits received military fatigues, ranks, and weapons at the M23 headquarters at Chanzu, and atRumangabo. FN18 They subsequently received a briefing at Chanzu and were mixed into different brigades. Former and current M23 cadres told the Group that demobilized soldiers usually performed specialized functions such as the operation of heavy weapons.

42. Demobilized Rwandan soldiers have been killed on M23 frontlines in the DRC. The Group obtained the identities and addresses of seven families residing in the northern Rwandan villages of Bigogwe and Mukamira, whose sons fought in the ranks of M23 as demobilized soldiers and died during the fighting between Makenga and Ntaganda.

43. Since the beginning of its current mandate, the Group has interviewed one active RDF soldier who was arrested in the DRC at the end of 2012. However, since the fall of Goma in November 2012, the Group has not documented any instances of full RDF units support toM23. FN19

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Mutaho operation

On 20 May 2013, three days prior to the visit of UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon to Goma, M23 unsuccessfully attempted to seize Mutaho hill, one of the FARDC’s positiondefending Goma (see annex 17). Current and former M23 members reported that M23redeployed troops towards Goma, vacating other positions (see annex 18). The rebels also moved their heavy weapons southwards (see annex 19). However, faced with strong resistance from the FARDC, the rebels retreated to their initial positions. According to former M23 officers who participated in the combat, M23 soldiers ran out of ammunition, lacked rockets and shells, suffered 40 dead and over 30 injured, and were compelled to announce a unilateral cease-fire, after failing to receive promised troo and ammunition support from within Rwanda (see annex 20). Between 21 and 22 May 2013, five 122mm cannon rounds were fired by M23 on a densely inhabited area of Goma and the Mugunga IDP camp (see annex 21). Two M23 members and three former M23 soldiers who participated in the fighting told the Group that the rounds had been fired on a civilian objective following an operator error (see para. 142). In early June 2013, an active M23 member and two M23 collaborators told the Group that M23 maintained troops in advanced positions close to Goma. According to the same sources, during a meeting held on 1 June at Chanzu, Makenga told his troops that operations on Goma were to be resumed.

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17 In Rwanda, most demobilized RDF soldiers and demobilized FDLR soldiers become part of the RDF Reserve Forces (see S/2012/843; para. 20).

18 M23 administrative headquarters are in Rumangabo and the military headquarters in Chanzu.

19 S/2012/348/Add.1, para. 31.

Meetings with RDF officers

44. The Group received information that M23 commanders have regularly met with RDF officers. Three former M23 officers, a former M23 cadre and several local authorities told the Group that, from March through May 2013, they had witnessed M23 Colonels Kaina and Yusuf Mboneza meeting with RDF officers at the border of Kabuhanga. Current and formeM23 members reported that some RDF officers, or their representatives, have also travelled to Chanzu or Rumangabo to hold meetings with Makenga.
Arms and ammunition used by M23.

45. FARDC officers and M23 members told the Group that, as it left Goma on 1 December 2012, M23 captured a large quantity of rockets, mortars and ammunition. However, current and former M23 members reported that while much of the ammunition stolen by the rebels in Goma is still available in the movement’s stocks, it does not always correspond to the types of weapons the rebels use.


46. According to M23 cadres, Ntaganda and Runiga financed M23 through a network of individual supporters and business dealings. They used part of their revenues to bribe M23 officers to join their side. M23 officers who had formerly supported Ntaganda told the Group that they had received salaries during his last few months with the M23 because he had attempted to buy their loyalties. All of the M23 officers and soldiers interviewed by the Group who surrendered from Makenga’s M23 stated that they had not received salaries while serving under Makenga.

47. According to current and former M23 members, M23 continue taxing commercial trucks crossing its checkpoints at Kibumba and Kiwanja, and the border at Bunagana; these taxes are currently the main source of revenues for M23. M23 tax USD 200 to USD 1000 per truck, depending on the load (see annex 22). According to M23 members, the movement earns an average of USD 6.000 per day from this taxation or USD 180.000 per month. Since Ntaganda’s surrender, Makenga has attempted to reorganize the movement’s finances (see annex 23).

B- Armed groups allied with M23

48. Since 2012, M23 has attempted to create a broad coalition of armed groups in theexpectation that simultaneous attacks on several fronts would overburden the FARDC.During 2013, M23 continued to foster insecurity while its representatives were at thenegotiating table in Kampala. The movement’s objective was to demonstrate the existence of a wider governance problem in the DRC, seemingly unrelated to M23. Following M23’s brief takeover of Goma, the rebels expanded their alliances in the DRC using Rwandan territory. After Ntaganda’s surrender, Makenga consolidated M23’s collaboration with most armed groups that Ntaganda and Runiga had originally mobilized. However, many of the M23-led alliances were short lived, as the DRC government managed to arrest or neutralize several M23 allies operating in South Kivu and the Beni area.

a- Union des forces révolutionnaires du Congo (UFRC)

49. In its 2012 final report, the Group documented M23 attempts to win allies in SouthKivu FN20. However, these alliances have not gained much ground, as M23 lacks popular support in South Kivu. After M23 withdrew from Goma on 1 December, its initiatives to open a second front in South Kivu continued. Gustave Bagayamukwe Tadji, a political activist and former employee of the DRC Central Bank, attempted to organize armed groups in South Kivu on behalf of M23.

50. In August 2012, Bagayamukwe travelled to M23-held areas to meet Col. Albert Kahasha, who hails from South Kivu and had joined M23 in Rutshuru, North Kivu. M23 commanders decided that Kahasha was to become the military leader of the M23 in South Kivu (see annex 24). Makenga coordinated Kahasha’s move to South Kivu with Bagayamukwe. According to Bagayamukwe, one of his collaborators, and a current M23 cadre, in November 2012 Kahasha travelled through Rwanda where he held a series of meetings, following which he crossed back into the DRC. After a failed attempt to integrate into the FARDC in November 2012, Kahasha fled to Walungu territory in South Kivu and continued his collaboration with

20 see S/2012/843, paras. 69-81

51. On 16 December 2012, Kahasha and Bagayamukwe created a political-military group called Dynamique populaire pour le changement (DPC), to bring together various armed groups for the M23. The declaration signed by Bagayamukwe and Kahasha at this occasion included the phrase “sent to M23 for approval” and called for all DRC institutions to be disbanded (see annex 25).

52. Bagayamukwe travelled again to M23-held Bunagana on 8 January 2013 to participate in a meeting led by sanctioned M23 leaders Runiga, Makenga and Ngaruye. The purpose of the meeting was to further consolidate M23 alliances and open a front in South Kivu. Bagayamukwe, a UFRC member, and a UFRC collaborator confirmed the details of this meeting to the Group. Two participants in the meeting, as well as two former M23 politicians, told the Group that representatives of several armed groups from South Kivu had gathered at Bunagana that day. Among the attendees were Benoît Kadage, Sadock Kayira, and Citoyen Ruhema, who lived in Kigali at the time and were trying to recruit members of the Banyamulenge community throughout the Great Lakes region for M23.

53. According to three participants in this meeting, Makenga thanked the attendees for having turned against the DRC Government, promised financial support, and stated that he maintained a weapons cache in South Kivu. He added that while M23 was not able to carry out military operations because it was negotiating in Kampala, “salvation needed to come from South Kivu”. After the meeting, Bagayamukwe spent several days in M23-held areas to learn about the movement (see annex 26).

54. Three UFRC members told the Group that through this coalition, M23 leaders intended to ally with several Raia Mutomboki factions operating in South Kivu and mobilize Banyamulenge youth, together with Lt Col. Bede Rusagara’s group under the command of Kahasha. According to the same sources, Raia Mutomboki Colonels Kashi Maheshe and Mukimbula Ndushi allied with M23, as well as Deogratias Bizibu Balola, the former opposition party Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social (UDPS) president in Bukavu, who resigned in September 2012 to create an armed group. The Group obtained a copy of a declaration made by Bagayamukwe during the meeting with M23 at Bunagana, in which he outlined the details of the armed groups he wished to federate (see annex 27). The Group also obtained the copy of a text message sent by Bagayamukwe on 3 February 2013, in which he claimed that he would soon liberate the DRC (see annex 28).

55. Bagayamukwe told the Group that he travelled to and from Bunagana through theCyanika border between Rwanda and Uganda (see annex 29), and that he subsequently went to Gisenyi, Rwanda. Bagayamukwe also reported that he had prepared a declaration creating UFRC in Gisenyi, which he released on 20 January 2013 (see annex 30); this was confirmed to the Group by a UFRC collaborator. In addition, M23 political cadres told the Group they had met Bagayamukwe in Gisenyi.

56. UFRC diaspora members interviewed by the Group confirmed that Bagayamukwe had coordinated the creation of the UFRC while he was in Rwanda. The Group obtained a rental contract in the name of Bagayamukwe for a residence in Kamembe, Rwanda (see annex 31), as well as a letter dated 6 January 2013 in which Bagayamukwe requested to set up his residence in Rwanda (see annex 32). After spending nearly three weeks in Rwanda between Kigali and Kamembe, Bagayamukwe travelled through Burundi to cross back into the DRC on 9 February, and was arrested the following day by the DRC authorities.

57. Bagayamukwe told the Group that the UFRC received the support of diaspora members. In this connection, the Group has been in contact with Tamusa Lumembo residing in Belgium, Moké Silubwe residing in France, and Gaudens Bisimwa residing in Germany. All three confirmed they were active UFRC members. The Group obtained the copy of a draft communiqué nominating Lumembo as the coordinator of the UFRC diaspora (see annex 33). After Bagayamukwe’s arrest, Silubwe became the president of the UFRC and issued a declaration condemning the arrest (see annex 34).

58. UFRC diaspora members told the Group that the diaspora is specifically tasked withcollecting money to finance the UFRC and that its members have opened a bank account for that purpose (see annex 35). The same sources reported that diaspora members created a budget based on the estimated cost of toppling the DRC Government (see annex 36). To date, the Group has concluded that the diaspora linked to the UFRC has mainly carried out propaganda on behalf of the movement; the Group intends to further investigate other forms of support.

59. The DRC Government cracked down on the UFRC and arrested Bagayamukwe and Colonels Mushamuka and Mbangu Mukaz, two Raia Mutomboki leaders operating under Kahasha’s command. As a result, the prospect of forming a coalition for South Kivu has lost momentum. However, Kahasha continues operating in Walungu alongside some Raia Mutomboki factions, maintains his alliance with M23 and enjoys the cooperation of the same diaspora members. On 24-25 April 2013, Kahasha attacked the positions of FARDC 1002 Regiment in Chishadu in South Kivu. Silubwe issued a communiqué acknowledging UFRC responsibility for the attack (see annex 37). While the communiqué claimed victory for UFRC, an FARDC officer and a UN source told the Group that several Raia Mutomboki soldiers had been killed in the battle.

b-Raia Mutomboki

60. Since 2011, Raia Mutomboki rapidly developed throughout South Kivu and then North Kivu. Most Raia Mutomboki members organized themselves as local defence groups against the FDLR. In 2012, the Group reported several cases of massacres of FDLR and their dependants committed by Raia Mutomboki (see S/2012/843, paras. 148-149). In March 2013, Mutuza Kasapa, a Raia Mutomboki commander in Shabunda, South Kivu, told the Group that Raia Mutomboki would not cease hostilities as long as there were Rwandophones in the Kivus. Raia Mutomboki groups have replaced the FDLR in certain areas, and levy taxes on trading routes and mines. Raia Mutomboki commanders Maj. Donat Omari Kengwa, Meshe, Constant and Ngandu met in mid-February 2013 in Kigulube to settle their differences, create a common structure and discuss their financing through taxation. Additional meetings took place in Shabunda in May and June 2013.

61. The Group’s final 2012 report documented M23 support to several Raia Mutomboki groups in southern Masisi territory, North Kivu FN21. The Raia Mutomboki commanders in Masisi had mostly maintained ties with Ntaganda and another sanctioned M23 leader, Lt. Col Eric Badege FN22. In March 2013, after Ntaganda’s loyal officers, including Badege, fled to Rwanda, one Raia Mutomboki leader visited M23 to initiate collaboration with Makenga’s branch. The Group obtained a draft document produced by a Raia Mutomboki group from Masisi, which criticizes the division created within M23 and aligns with M23 agenda. It also requests the departure of the FDLR and threatens to kill FDLR members (see annex 38). In spite of the enmity of the Raia Mutomboki towards Rwandophones, M23 managed to ally with certain Raia Mutomboki factions, although this has created tensions because of thepopular resentment against the M23 in South Kivu (see paras. 54 and 59).

c- Union pour la réhabilitation de la démocratie du Congo (URDC)

62. In 2012 and 2013, there has been a proliferation of armed groups in the North Kivuterritories of Lubero and Beni. These militias consist almost entirely of members of theNande community. The most significant group is the Union pour la réhabilitation de ladémocratie du Congo (URDC), led by “Brigadier General” Paluku Kombi Hilaire, whodefected from the FARDC in June 2012. The URDC has alliances with other rebel groups, including M23.

63. According to ex-combatants, local leaders, and Congolese officials, URDC represents the opposition of local politicians and businessmen to the central government. In mid-2012, Mr. Mbusa Nyamwisi, a DRC opposition politician currently residing in South Africa, acted on this discontent by encouraging Congolese soldiers – many of whom had served in the armed wing of Nyamwisi’s RCD-K/ML rebel group – to defect and join Hilaire’s group. Nyamwisi’s affiliate Andy Laurent Patandjila Paluku also recruited demobilized RCD-K/ML militants and other youth to join URDC (see S/2012/843, para. 65).

64. Hilaire’s group consists of approximately 300 combatants operating in three camps.Hilaire leads the main group based at Bunyatenge in Lubero territory, while a “Col.”Werrason heads a second group based at Mumbiri in Beni territory. “Col.” Eric Kenzo, a former member of PARECO (see S/2011/738, para. 266), leads a third group at Kyavinyonge in Virunga National Park, in Beni Territory. This group consists of remnants of the group formerly headed by “Col.” David Lusenge. Former combatants, local leaders, and Congolese authorities state that Hilaire’s groups obtain weapons and ammunition from local FARDC
soldiers (either by purchasing the arms or attacking and looting FARDC positions), fromM23 (see below), and from smugglers who bring arms from Uganda.

65. Mr. Nyamiwisi recruited Lusenge, who deserted from FARDC in November 2012 to join Hilaire. According to Congolese and Ugandan authorities, Lusenge carried out recruitment inUganda with the support of s anctioned individual Kakolele Bwambale. The Group interviewed four Ugandan nationals who had been recruited and armed by Bwambale and Lusenge, and who were arrested by the DRC authorities at Kamango in March 2013 (see annex 39). Lusenge informed the Group that he coordinated his operations with Hilaire and admitted that he was in regular contact with M23 commanders after his desertion in November 2012. In April 2012, Congolese authorities requested Bwambale to come to Kinshasa while Lusenge surrendered to the FARDC. In May 2012, Ugandan authorities arrested Loli Adrain, aka Muhumuza, who recruited on behalf of Lusenge and Bwambale iKampala.

21 see S/2012/843, para. 63

22 see S/2012/843, paras. 62-63

66. According to local authorities and escapees or former abductees interviewed byMONUSCO, Kenzo’s group is responsible for some of the 160 kidnappings of children and adults in Beni territory since the beginning of 2013 (see annexes 40and 41). Escapees and former abductees stated that some of them underwent military training, while others were used for forced labor. The Group continues to investigate the identities and motives of the kidnappers and the fate of the abductees.

67. On 15 May 2013, Kenzo’s troops, including child soldiers, led members of other local militias in an attack against the FARDC base in Beni town to liberate prisoners and loot weapons. Seven FARDC soldiers wounded in the attack told the Group that most of the attackers were armed with spears and machetes, and some AK-47s. FARDC suffered nine dead and 17 wounded, while 33 Mai Mai combatants were killed and eight were captured.

68. According to ex-combatants, local leaders, and Congolese government officials, Hilaire maintains close ties with M23 (see S/2012/843, para. 66). These same sources told the Group that during May 2013, M23 sent troops and arms to Hilaire in an attempt to establish a M23 presence in Lubero and Beni territories before the deployment of the FIB. Hilaire communicates with M23 through Lt. Col. Tahanga Nyoro Kasereka, an FARDC deserter who acts as a political liaison between Mbusa Nyamwisi, M23, and Hilaire. A former combatant, two local leaders and three Congolese government officials informed the Group that Andy Patandjila was one of several Nyamwisi associates among the pro-Ntaganda M23 political cadres who surrendered on 16 March 2013 in Rwanda (see annex 42).

69. URDC also works closely with “Major General” Kakule Sikula Lafontaine, who leads the Union des patriotes du Congo pour la paix (UPCP), operating around Bunyatenge in Lubero Territory (see annex 43). After defecting from the FARDC, Hilaire was initially subordinate to Lafontaine. Former combatants, government officials, and UN sources indicated to the Group that Hilaire now wields greater operational power than Lafontaine over militias in Beni and Lubero territories.

70. Hilaire also coordinates with the militia controlled by Paul “Morgan” Sadala (see para. 70). Former combatants and local leaders stated that Hilaire supplied Morgan with weapons and ammunition in exchange for gold and ivory. The same sources reported that Hilaire has occasionally dispatched some of his combatants to support operations conducted by Morgan, including the 6 January 2013 attack on Mambasa town (see para. 73).

71. According to former combatants, local leaders and Congolese government authorities, URDC and other militias primarily finance themselves by exploiting natural resources, especially gold and ivory, and trading these resources with businessmen in Beni, Butembo, and Kasindi. According to these sources, during 2012 and early 2013, Congolese businessman Muhindo Kasebere was the most prominent financier and supplier of arms and ammunition to Hilaire’s militias (see para. 198). In December 2012, Congolese authorities arrested Mr. Arnold Musinganinya, a businessman and relative of Mbusa Nyamwisi, for recruiting ex-RCD/K-ML soldiers for Hilaire’s group by offering them 100,000 Congolese francs ($111).

C- Other Congolese armed groups

Mai Mai Morgan

72. Paul Sadala (alias Morgan) is an armed group leader operating in the territories ofMambasa and Bafwasende of Orientale Province (see S/2012/843, paras. 128-132). Morgan commands several dozen combatants who operate in small groups out of shifting campsMorgan frequently swells his ranks with recruits from Kisangani or troops dispatched from allies such as Col. Hilaire Kambale Kombi of URDC (see para. 70) and Mai Mai Simba (see S/2011/738, paras. 246-251), when he carries out major attacks.

73. On 6 January 2013, Morgan led a group of approximately 150 armed troops, including some of Hilaire’s soldiers, in an attack on Mambasa town, the capital ofMambasa Territory in the Ituri District. According to local authorities and UN sources, during this attack, Morgan’s forces looted goods and money, and raped approximately 50 women. Soldiers from the FARDC 905th Regiment, under the command of Col. John Tchinyama, pushed Morgan’s forces out of Mambasa, with support from the Ituri Brigade of MONUSCO. Nine FARDC soldiers, six civilians, and about 45 Mai Mai were killed during the retaking of Mambasa.

74. Two people who had been abducted by Morgan and one former Mai Mai combatant told the Group that on several occasions, they overheard Morgan talking to FARDC officers on a satellite phone prior to and during the attack on Mambasa. These people further informed the Group that allies within FARDC guided Morgan along routes through which he could avoid encountering government forces.

75. After recapturing Mambasa town, some FARDC soldiers committed human rights abuses while searching for remnants of Morgan’s forces. Local populations and civil society representatives reported that some FARDC troops had engaged in rape, harassment, extortion and arbitrary arrests. The Group obtained video footage, which it intends to archive, showing that on 7 January 2013, FARDC soldiers had engaged in cruel, degrading, and inhumane treatment of Mai Mai suspects at Hotel Pygmy in Mambasa town (see annex 44).

76. According to civil society groups and MONUSCO investigators, between 1 and 5November 2012 alone, Morgan’s group raped or sexually mutilated more than 150 women during a series of attacks on villages in a gold-mining area south of Mambasa. Former captives told the Group that on several occasions, Morgan’s group had engaged in cannibalism and killed and injured people by setting them on fire (see annex 45). Six former captives told the Group that Morgan’s group had captured more than 50 women and used them as sexual slaves (see para. 146). While Morgan is the overall commander, other leaders include his lieutenant, Manu, and a witch doctor named Jean Pierre (alias JP or “Docteur”) (see annex 46).

77. Morgan is a long-time poacher of elephants in and around the Okapi Fauna Reserve, but in the last year, he has increasingly sustained his group by stealing and selling gold, as well as by pillaging the property of local populations. In late 2012 and early 2013, Morgan’s group attacked mines near Biakato, Elota and Pangoy, stole gold from miners, and killed at least two elephants for ivory. The Group confirmed this with four people abducted by Morgan’s group as well as from several community leaders in Epulu and Mambasa. The Group continues to investigate Morgan’s connections to criminal networks in Orientale Province (see S/2012/843, para. 129).

78. FARDC attacked Morgan’s group in early 2013, causing it to fragment into small armed criminal bands. His force continues to carry out attacks. For instance, on 2 June 2013, Morgan and his troops attacked two sites near Adusa village (west of Epulu), killing 2 FARDC soldiers, wounding three women and one soldier, stealing weapons and gold, and abducting several people, including women and children.


79. There has been little progress since the Group’s final 2012 report on integrating intoFARDC, or defeating, the Forces de résistance patriotiques en Ituri (FRPI), led by “Brig. Gen.” Justin Banaloki, alias “Cobra Matata” (see S/2012/843, paras. 83-84). FRPI controls a large part of eastern and southern Irumu territory in Orientale Province’s Ituri District, centered on Walendu Bindi chefferie, where it has resisted government control since 2001.

80. Cobra Matata nominally remains the head of the Coalition des groupes armés de l’Ituri (COGAI), which destabilized Ituri during 2012 but was weakened by FARDC operations (see S/2012/843, para. 85). Five local leaders and civil society representatives in Ituri and Kampala informed the Group that Mateso Savo, who was the main financier of COGAI, has been living in Kampala since FARDC raided his farm in September 2012 near Jiba in the Ituri District (see S/2012/843, para. 85). Among the five groups that are officially part of COGAI, FN23 only FRPI is currently active. The remnants of other groups were integrated into FRPI.

81. On 22 May 2013, seven senior FRPI leaders, including “Col.” Mbadhu and “Col.” Hitler (see annex 47), told the Group they wanted to reach an agreement with the centralgovernment similar to the 23 March 2009 accord that Kinshasa made with CNDP and other armed groups (see S/2010/596, para. 165). FRPI leaders told the Group that their main objectives were to be integrated into the FARDC at their current (self-proclaimed) ranks, to remain in Ituri, and to have the government liberate and grant amnesty to FRPI prisoners.

23 Col. Hitler told the Group that the five members of COGAI are: FRPI, General Cobra commanding, based in Irumu territory; FRPI-Aru, Col. Eneko commanding, based in Aru territory; FPDDI (Front populaire pour la défense et le développement de l’Ituri), Col. Hitler commanding, based in Djugu territory; FAII (Force armée d’intégration Iturienne), Col. Semire commanding; and FAR (Force armée de la révolution), Col. Kabu commanding.

82. FRPI claims to represent the Ngiti (Lendu) community in Walendu Bindi, but enjoys only limited local support. Six local leaders and residents of Walendu Bindi told the Group that FRPI harasses and collects taxes from local populations. For example, each household is required to pay 500 Congolese francs ($0.55) plus a basin full of food on a monthly or sometimes a weekly basis. FRPI also sustains itself with funds from artisanal gold mining in Bavi (see S/2012/843, para. 84). Since the beginning of 2013, FRPI militias have looted several thousand head of cattle from ranchers within and around their area of control. Walendu Bindi leaders have publicly opposed the cattle thefts. Four local leaders and residents in Walendu Bindi and Bahema Sud collectivities told the Group that Hema and Bira leaders in areas around FRPI territory were creating self-defence groups to protect cattle herds and local communities.

Kata Katanga

83. Kata Katanga (a Swahili phrase meaning “cut off Katanga”) is a loosely structured armed group that brings together individuals and groups advocating for the secession of Katanga Province from DRC. The most significant armed group leader is Kyungu Mutanga, aka Gédéon, who operates in the areas of Manono, Mitwaba and Pweto. Gédéon is allied with the armed wing of Coordination pour le référendum et l’autodétermination du Katanga (CORAK) (see S/2011/738, paras. 272-277), which calls itself CORAK Kata Katanga, or simply Kata Katanga.

84. Four senior Kata Katanga leaders told the Group that Kata Katanga is not a Mai Mai organization, but rather a group consisting of “Katangan Tiger” soldiers who fought against the Mobutu regime in the 1970s and against the AFDL in 1998. It also includes younger followers. Eight Kata Katanga members among those arrested in March 2013 and transferred to Kinshasa (see below) told the Group that the leader of CORAK is Ferdinand Ntanda Imena, who lives in exile. However, in a sign that CORAK’s leadership remains disputed, the four Kata Katanga leaders interviewed by the Group stated that Ntanda Imena only directs certain groups within Kata Katanga, while others operate semi-autonomously.

85. The Kata Katanga movement is linked to debates over Katanga’s future political status. While Kata Katanga represents the radical wing of a long-standing movement for Katanga to become an independent state, other political interests favor decentralization (dividing Katanga into four provinces), or federalism (leaving Katanga intact as a province of the DRC but giving it greater autonomy). Politicians in southern Katanga, where most of the province’s vast mineral wealth is concentrated, generally support decentralization, but politicians in northern Katanga, which is poor by comparison, generally oppose such a move and favor Katanga remaining intact as a province or an independent country. Although the secession sentiment is strongest among older Katangans who were part of provincial independence movements in the 1960s and 1970s, Kata Katanga has recently attracted many disaffected youth into its ranks.

86. Kata Katanga states that its principal objective is to fight for the independence ofKatanga. Its leaders told the Group that they have troops in Kamina, Manono, Mitwaba, Kalemie, Pweto, and Bendera, as well as in Lubumbashi. The group claims to be recruiting new members and providing them with military training. The group also claims to have links with Katangan political leaders at the national, provincial, and local levels; sympathizers within the FARDC and the PNC; and Katangan diaspora in Europe and North America.

87. In late 2012 and early 2013, armed activities in Katanga resulted in serious human rights violations and breaches of international humanitarian law. The perpetrators of these violations are both armed groups, some of which are aligned with Kata Katanga, and the FARDC, which has been conducting operations against Kata Katanga (see annex 48). Violence in Katanga has been characterized by massacres, summary executions, ethnically targeted attacks, and burning of people, homes, and property. This violence has led to an increase in internally displaced persons (IDPs), which number approximately 365,000 as of June 2013. Most of these displacements are in the area between Manono, Mitwaba, and Pweto, with the latter recording the highest number of the IDPs (159,000). In total, 10 out of the 22 territories of the province are affected.

88. On 23 March 2013, a group of 336 Kata Katanga members entered Lubumbashi. During their march to the MONUSCO headquarters in town, where they planned to make a plea for independence, Congolese soldiers (Republican Guard and FARDC soldiers) and police shot at the lightly-armed Kata Katanga group, killing and injuring scores. When the group entered MONUSCO headquarters, the Republican Guard fired dozens of shots at the MONUSCO base, causing damage to MONUSCO premises (see paragraph 139 and annex 67).

89. Following the 23 March incident, FARDC embarked on operations against armed groups in Katanga. There have been numerous clashes between FARDC and Kata Katanga during April and May 2013, but Kata Katanga has also battled newly formed self-defense groups in central and northern Katanga. These self-defense groups fight Kata Katanga in order to control mining sites, such as the gold mine at Ntoya and toprotect communities that oppose Kata Katanga’s objectives.

III – Foreign armed groups

A – Allied Democratic Forces

90. The ADF is an Islamist rebel group led by Ugandan fighters and operating northwest of the Rwenzori Mountains in North Kivu. ADF’s current strength is estimated to range between 800 and 1200 soldiers. FN24 ADF is a tightly controlled organization, with close to no combatants who surrender, and there are persistent reports that ADF has attempted to increase its numbers through recruitment and kidnappings during early 2013.

24 The Group is investigating claims that ADF has greater numbers of combatants.

91. Since 2011, Jamil Mukulu, the ADF’s sanctioned leader who previously undertookextensive travel, has been primarily based in the DRC, according to Ugandan intelligence, an ADF collaborator, and a former ADF soldier. The same sources informed the Group that Mukulu’s headquarters is currently located north-east of Eringeti at a camp called Madinat Tawheed Muwaheedina (MTM). ADF maintains two other camps called Canada and Commander Ibrahim Battle Group (CIBG). MONUSCO and Ugandan intelligence reported that the ADF has recently opened new camps east of Eringeti.

92. According to a former ADF soldier, an ADF collaborator and Ugandan authorities, ADF maintains regional networks for recruitment in Uganda and Burundi. As of June 2013, Ugandan authorities had arrested several people they accuse of recruiting adults and children for ADF on Ugandan territory. Two former ADF soldiers and UN sources stated that ADF engage in voluntary recruitment in Uganda, but also deceives potential recruits with promises of employment or education. It primarily recruits in eastern Uganda and transports the recruits into the DRC through the border village of Bwera. Ugandan authorities also reported that in 2012, ADF elements in Uganda killed five former ADF collaborators; two former ADF collaborators confirmed this to the Group. Ugandan authorities arrested the individuals suspected of the killings.

93. According to FARDC and former ADF elements, ADF has also recruited in the DRC in 2013 and carried out a series of abductions of Congolese nationals in Eringeti and Oicha areas for recruitment purposes. Congolese authorities estimate that ADF abducted about 80 civilians since the beginning of 2013, including women and children (see annex 41).

94. A former ADF soldier and Ugandan intelligence told the Group that Mukulu requires all women and children present in ADF camps, both dependents of ADF soldiers and recruits, to receive military training. The same sources stated that compulsory military training commences for boys at the age of 10 and for girls at the age of 15. The Group obtained video material of training sessions of children and women carried out in ADF camps in 2012.

95. A former ADF soldier and Ugandan intelligence estimate that ADF’s arsenal consists of mortars, machine guns, and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG). Former ADF soldiers told the Group that when foreign trainers visited ADF in the past, they instructed them on the assembly of improvised explosive devices.

96. Two former ADF soldiers and Ugandan intelligence reported that ADF received money transfers from London, Kenya, and Uganda, which are collected by Congolese intermediaries in Beni and Butembo. According to the same sources, ADF commander Benjamin Kisokeranyo is in charge of intelligence, finances, and supplies within the ADF (see annex 49). Two former ADF soldiers and Ugandan authorities stated that ADF also derives funding from its network of car and motorcycle taxis operating in andbetween Butembo, Beni and Oicha. ADF also derives profits from gold and timber exports to Uganda. Ugandan and Burundian intelligence told the Group that the ADF continues to collaborate with Al-Shabaab in 2013 (see S/2012/843, para.105). The Group is further investigating financial support to the ADF and potential links with Al-Shabaab.

B – Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda – FDLR

97. The FDLR continued to weaken during the first half of 2013. FDLR currently hasapproximately 1,500 soldiers25, the majority of whom deployed in North Kivu and theremainder in South Kivu. The decrease in the strength of FDLR is mostly due to a highsurrender rate. During 2012, MONUSCO DDRRR repatriated 1,441 foreign FDLRcombatants, and demobilized 398 FDLR Congolese combatants.26 However, the rate of FDLR surrenders has declined since the beginning of 2013. As of 14 June 2013, only 309 FDLR combatants have surrendered to DDRRR.

98. During 2012, Raia Mutomboki attacks against the FDLR forced the latter to redeploy towards the east of North Kivu, and towards the south of South Kivu. As a result, there is a gap of 400 kilometers between the northern and southern FDLR sectors, and hardly any movement of troops between the two sectors (see annex 50). As a consequence of the Raia Mutomboki threat, Maj. Gen. Sylvestre Mudacumura, FDLR’s military commander, shifted his headquarters northward to the Ngango area, in Walikale, North Kivu (see annex 51).

99. The FDLR suffers from internal divisions and a weak hierarchy that lacks the capability to command and control the organization’s entire operations. The movement’s leadership is divided between hardliners such as Mudacumura who want to continue the armed struggle, and moderates belonging to younger generations, who favor demobilization and reintegration. The FDLR command has been further weakened by the arrest in Tanzania in early 2013 of FDLR deputy commander and sanctioned individual General Stanislas Nzeyimana, aka Izabayo Bigaruka, who had travelled on a clandestine mission and in violation of the travel ban. FDLR officers and intelligence sources from the region confirmed Nzeyimana’s arrest and told the Group that Rwandan officials are currently detaining Bigaruka. However, in a letter to the Group, the Government of Rwanda denied having arrested or detained Bigaruka.

100. The Group has not found any evidence that FDLR receives significant financial or other support from abroad. The Group has investigated a diaspora network led by Bernard Twayiramungu, Felicien Barabwiriza, and Jean Bosco Uwihanganye, who have been residing in Germany. In December 2012, German authorities arrested these individuals and charged them on suspicion of belonging to a terrorist organization. The Group continues to investigate FDLR support networks that may be maintained in Europe.

FDLR attacks in Rwanda

101. Since M23 took control of the area along the border with Rwanda in Rutshuru territory, FDLR concentrated its troops adjacent to M23-controlled areas and carried out three attacks on Rwandan soil in late 2012 and mid-2013. FDLR officers told the Group that the objective
of these attacks was to show the FDLR was not a dying force. The same sources stated that the incursions into Rwanda have boosted the morale of FDLR troops, and encouraged their leaders to plan other attacks.

25 The Group based its estimates on MONUSCO DDRRR figures, as well as on interviews with current and former FDLR soldiers. However, in a communication to the Group, the Rwandan Government estimated the current FDLR strength to be 5000 troops.

26 During 2012, DDRRR also repatriated 1,587 FDLR dependents.

102. On 27 November 2012, taking advantage of M23’s movement toward Goma, which left its western flank exposed, about 160 FDLR soldiers crossed into Rwandan territory through Gasizi. According to FDLR officers, a Commando de recherche et d’action en profondeur (CRAP) unit operating from Nyamulagira had crossed into Rwanda ahead of the attack. The FDLR targeted RDF positions at Kabuhanga and Muti, in Rubavu district (see annex 52). On 2 December, about 80 FDLR soldiers infiltrated into Rwanda near Mount Visoke and attacked the RDF position nearby Kinigi, killing one park ranger (see annex 53).

103. FDLR spokesperson La Forge Fils Bayeze publicly claimed FDLR responsibility for these attacks. FDLR cadres and surrendered soldiers reported that FDLR North Kivu Sector deputy commander Col. Stanislas Gakwerere, alias Stany, coordinated these incursions, acting under Sector commander Col. Pacifique Ntavunguka, alias Omega, and ultimately on
the orders of Mudacumura.

104. Rwandan officials told the Group that the RDF killed 30 FDLR soldiers and captured one FDLR soldier during the November and December attacks. RDF officers recovered weapons used by the FDLR during their incursion, as well as telephones, sim cards, identity cards, and FDLR documents (see annex 54). RDF officers also discovered a hand-drawn map of the DRC-Rwanda border area, and a list of radio signs in the belongings of the dead FDL soldiers (see annex 55).

105. According to FDLR and M23 commanders, on 24 May 2013, when most of M23’s troops were engaged in a failed offensive near Goma, FDLR infiltrated again into Rwanda through Gasizi to launch another attack.

FDLR – FARDC cooperation

106. Faced with the rapidly evolving M23 rebellion in 2012, the FARDC first abided by a tacit non-aggression agreement with the FDLR. However, the declining security situation in eastern DRC, culminating with the fall of Goma on 20 November 2013, enhanced the collaboration between some FARDC units and the FDLR in areas of close proximity with M23-controlled territory. The Group has documented local-level collaboration between the FARDC and the FDLR, and continues to investigate the extent to which the FARDC hierarchy may be involved in such collaboration. The Group sent a letter on 12 June 2013 to the Government of DRC asking for clarification about this support and is awaiting a reply.

107. The Group interviewed 10 FARDC soldiers in Tongo, in North Kivu, who reported that FARDC and FDLR regularly meet and exchange operational information. These same sources stated that FARDC soldiers supplied ammunition to the FDLR. Col. Faida Fidel Kamulete, the commander of FARDC 2nd battalion of 601st Regiment based at Tongo, denied such collaboration, but declared to the Group that FARDC and FDLR do not fight each other. FDLR officers and an FDLR collaborator told the Group that “Col.” Jean-Baptiste Gakwerere aka Esdras Kaleb, who commands the FDLR deployed in Tongo is in charge of the coordination between FDLR and FARDC officers in the area.

108. Four former FDLR soldiers from Tongo and Bambo confirmed to the Group thatFARDC soldiers had transferred ammunition to FDLR, with the instruction that it had to be used against M23. In January 2013, two FDLR former soldiers witnessed separately meetings between FARDC and FDLR in the Tongo area, at which they exchanged operational information. One of the soldiers told the Group that he saw FARDC transfer ammunition to FDLR during one of these meetings, while the second saw an FARDC officer give boxes of submachine gun ammunition to the rebels. Between January and April 2013, a former FDLR soldier witnessed four distinct ammunition transfers by the FARDC based at Bambo to the FDLR, while in February, another former FDLR soldier saw FARDC hand over ammunition to the FDLR, also at Bambo.

109. An FARDC officer and local leaders from Muja, 10 kilometers north west of Goma, also reported to the Group a pattern of collaboration between the FARDC and the FDLR. The FARDC has established positions at Muja and Rusayo to defend Goma against the M23. According to FDLR commanders, the FDLR North Kivu Sector CRAP unit under “Maj.” Alexis, usually based at the Nyamulagira volcano in the Virunga National Park, carries out regular operations in that area. The Group interviewed two former FDLR soldiers who surrendered from Muja, and both were aware of ammunition transfers from FARDC commanders. One of the former soldiers claimed to have witnessed the supply of boxes of submachine gun ammunition from FARDC soldiers to the FDLR.

C- Forces nationales de libération

110. Forces nationales de libération (FNL) operates in South Kivu province and consists mainly of Burundian combatants whose stated aim is to overthrow the Government of Burundi. In 2013, FNL remains divided and weakened (see S/2012/843, paras. 112-113). On 14 January 2013, an FNL press release announced the dismissal of its president Agathon Rwasa and his replacement by Isidore Nibisi, with “General” Aloys Nzamapema as the military commander-in-chief. Since then, FNL has attempted to build up its strength in South Kivu to carry out attacks in Burundi.

111. FNL has two main military factions. “Gen.” Nzamapema, who split from “Gen.”Antoine “Shuti” Baranyanka in 2012, leads the strongest faction. Former FNL combatants and FARDC officers stated that Nzamapema’s headquarters is still located in Mushule, with bases in Magunda and Ruhuha, in Uvira plateaux, in Uvira territory. While in 2012 Mai Mai Mayele hosted Shuti and his troops in Lusambo, Fizi territory, they have since left the group (see S/2012/843, para.112).

112. FNL conducted raids in DRC and Burundi to forcibly recruit youth and obtain food supplies. In February 2013, FNL troops raided cattle in Buringa, in Burundi. Former FNL soldiers and Burundian intelligence told the Group that FNL’s head of operations, Innocent Ngendakuriyo, aka Nzarabu, led the raid. Nzarabu was convicted during the trial for the 2011 Gatumba massacre, west of Bujumbura, but escaped from prison in late 2012. In mid-May 2013, the FNL carried out another raid in Buringa.

113. FARDC and the Force de défense nationale du Burundi (FDN, the Burundian national army) continued to attack FNL on both sides of the border. According to FARDC intelligence and Burundian civil society, “Colonel” Negamiye, Nzamapema’s deputy, was killed during FARDC operations following FNL attacks in late October 2012 in villages near Magunda, in the Uvira plateau, in which FNL soldiers looted goods, burned hundreds of houses and killed at least 6 people.

114. According to an FDLR combatant and Burundian intelligence, FNL and FDLR troops conduct joint operations in South Kivu. At the end of January, they fought together against a local armed group in Masango, and burnt houses and schools during the raid. The FDLR also provided training in heavy weapons to the FNL at the Namaramara base near Itombwe.

D – Front du peuple murundi

115. In 2012 the Group reported that the Front du peuple murundi/alliance divine pour la nation (FPM/ADN), a group of 40 Burundian Tutsi soldiers, had joined with the Mouvement congolais pour le changement (MCC), an M23 ally in South Kivu, led by “Col.” Bede Rusagara (see S/2012/843, paras. 70-76). In March 2013, the commander in chief of FPM, “Col.” Jean-Claude Mutoni, aka Kasongo, was killed during fighting between the FPM and a Congolese armed group under the orders of Col. Richard Tawimbi FN27, according to FARDC, Burundian intelligence and armed groups members. In June 2013, the president of the FPM/ADN, Guillaume George Majambere, who currently resides in Belgium (see S/2012/843, para. 114), confirmed to the Group that he had become the leader of an alliance called Intore. This group is a coalition of several armed groups and political parties, with the objective of challenging the party in power in Burundi.

116. In October 2012, Rusagara told the Group that MCC was responsible for the death on 4 October of a Burundian military intelligence officer on mission in the DRC. The spokesperson of the FPM, Major Fidèle Nzambiyakira, an ex-member of the FDN dismissed in October 2010, also claimed responsibility for this death in a press statement (see annex 56).

117. FPM aims at organizing sabotage actions in Burundi and is training troops accordingly. In November 2012, FPM/ADN posted pictures of combatants undertaking training in the Uvira Plateaux in the DRC on its website (see annex 57). On 22 October 2012, after 25 to 30 FPM soldiers launched an attack in the Cibitoke area of Burundi, the FDN conducted
operations against the group for several days. Burundian intelligence services told the Group that they killed and injured several FPM soldiers. According to FDN, they captured two combatants and seized several weapons (see annex 58). Burundian intelligence later told the Group that FPM’s objective was to establish a base in the Nyungwe forest in Rwanda, at the border with DRC and Burundi, as FARDC and FDN operations impeded their movements in the Ruzizi plain in the DRC, which is their usual route into Burundi.

27 See S/2011/738, paras. 285 and 656.
IV – Integration challenges facing armed groups

118. Overstretched by the rapidly expanding M23 crisis, starting in mid-2012 the FARDC undertook an accelerated integration program into FARDC of armed groups opposed to the M23. In its 2012 final report, the Group reported on the integration of Nyatura (see S/2012/843, paras. 120-125). In 2013, integration exercises continued, with mixed results.

Failed integration: Alliance pour un Congo libre et souverain in Kitchanga

119. On 9 January 2013, as part of an attempt to integrate Gen. Janvier Buigo’s Alliance pour un Congo libre et souverain (APCLS), a predominantly Hunde armed group, the FARDC 8th Military Region commander Gen. Bauma ordered 300 APCLS soldiers under “Col.” Musa
Jumapili to be integrated in situ into the FARDC at Kitchanga, North Kivu. While the 812th FARDC regiment commanded by Col. Mudahunga was then based at Kitchanga, FARDC commanders had not taken steps to coordinate the integration of APCLS into this local unit.

120. The integration was hindered by Mudahunga’s collaboration with Ntaganda’s M23. An M23 collaborator, a former M23 soldier and an APCLS officer reported that Ntaganda’s allies in Kitchanga worked clandestinely with Mudahunga and his deputy Lt Col. Alexis Muhire to recruit for M23 and establish a rear base for the movement at Kitchanga. M23 cadres and an FARDC soldier told the Group that Mudahunga also protected land owned by M23 commanders in that area. Former M23 soldiers and armed groups operating in the Virunga National Park told the Group that Ntaganda had sent patrols to Kitchanga on regular occasions.

121. According to authorities in Kitchanga, after integrating into FARDC, APCLS patrolled the town and arrested individuals with suspected links to the M23. According to an FARDC officer, Mudahunga wanted to prevent the APCLS from controlling Kitchanga and interfering with M23 recruitment. Mudahunga told the APCLS to disarm, but the APCLS refused.
Gradually, the tensions between the FARDC and the APCLS acquired an ethnic character, as FARDC accused the ethnic Hunde residents of Kitchanga of supporting APCLS.

122. A former M23 officer and two FARDC officers operating under Mudahunga’s orders told the Group that on 24 February 2013 both Mudahunga and Muhire distributed arms to Rwandophone youth and cattle herders in Kitchanga and in the nearby Kahe IDP camp, and incited them to attack ethnic Hundes. One of the officers saw Muhire distribute weapons in
his compound at Kitchanga, while another officer saw Mudahunga distribute AK-47 rifles to cattle herders. Mudahunga and Muhire told Rwandophone populations they needed their help to combat the Hunde. According to FARDC soldiers, those who received the weapons fought
alongside FARDC during the combat against APCLS.

123. Local authorities stated that tensions rose after FARDC executed an APCLS major on 26 February 2013. Former APCLS soldiers told the Group that APCLS subsequently killed one of Mudahunga’s soldiers, following which the APCLS advanced towards the FARDC position in Kitchanga and the IDP camp at Kahe. IDPs from Kahe declared that APCLS soldiers entered the camp saying they wanted to rid the area of Rwandophones, and burned 20 huts (see annex 59).

124. According to two FARDC soldiers serving under Mudahunga, he ordered his soldiers to “kill everybody without distinction in Kitchanga”, as he considered that all of the ethnic Hunde were APCLS supporters. The Group obtained a recorded statement in which Mudahunga ordered his officers to “kill whoever they find in Kitchanga”. FN28 FARDC soldiers
fired mortar rounds into Kitchanga to prevent APCLS from advancing; however, manymortar shells landed in civilian areas (see annex 60). The Group was able to examinerecovered mortar shells when it visited the area (see annex 61). Local authorities told theGroup that FARDC soldiers actively searched for ethnic Hunde chiefs to kill them. TheGroup spoke to a local chief who survived, and who heard soldiers looking for him saying that “they do not want to see Hundes in Kitchanga anymore”. Local authorities reported that another local chief did not manage to escape and was killed (see para. 129).

125. After the events, the 812th Regiment was redeployed from Kitchanga, and on 25 March Bauma announced that the integration of the APCLS will not be completed.

V – Violations of international humanitarian and human rights law


FARDC and APCLS killings in Kitchanga

126. Fighting in February and March 2013 in Kitchanga (North Kivu) between the 812th FARDC Regiment and the APCLS resulted in at least 90 dead, and over 500 houses burnt (see annex 62). According to Médecins sans Frontières (MSF), more than 140 people were injured, and hundreds of houses and key infrastructures destroyed, including part of the hospital (see para. 122 and annex 63). According to OCHA, the fighting temporarily
displaced about 100,000 people.

127. The Group visited Kitchanga and interviewed local authorities, survivors of the battle, and APCLS and FARDC soldiers. The Group’s investigation revealed that FARDC Col. Mudahunga issued orders to his soldiers to carry out attacks targeting civilians at Kitchanga, including shelling of an area inhabited by civilians, causing considerable collateral damage (see para. 122).

128. Local authorities and FARDC told the Group that most of the victims were Hundepopulations and most of the houses targeted belonged to ethnic Hundes. The same sources stated that FARDC soldiers under Mudahunga and young men armed by them, specifically targeted Hunde civilians and killed them. The same sources revealed that APCLS under Col. Musa also committed targeted killings of Rwandophone civilians in the Kahe IDP camp, where they burned 20 huts (see para.121).

28 The Group has filed the recording in the UN archives.


129. Between 8 and 15 March 2013, during the M23 infighting between forces loyal toNtaganda and forces loyal to Makenga, Ntaganda ordered the execution of his owncombatants who attempted to desert in Kibumba. Former M23 soldiers witnessed Ntaganda ordering the execution of at least 20 of his combatants, who were either shot or stabbed to death. Two former Ntagada’s fighters saw about 20 bodies of fellow combatants. Another former M23 soldier witnessed Ntaganda order the execution of a group of eight soldiers. Two additional former M23 soldiers witnessed the execution of six soldiers within their unit.

130. The Group also documented a pattern of execution of war wounded, on the orders of Ntaganda and Ngaruye. According to current and former M23 officers, who participated in combat alongside Ntaganda during the M23 scission, Ntaganda and Ngaruye ordered the execution of wounded soldiers. Former M23 soldiers witnessed Ntaganda personally shoot war wounded with his pistol.

131. Between 21 and 22 May 2013, five 122mm rounds fired from the M23 position landed on Ndosho and in the Mugunga IDP camp (see Mutaho box). The rounds killed two civilians and injured nine. Current and former M23 officers interviewed by the Group declared that this happened due to calculation error by M23.

Sexual violence


132. From 20 to 30 November 2012, FARDC soldiers committed mass rapes in Minova (South Kivu) and the surrounding villages of Bwisha, Buganga, Mubimbi, Kishinji, Katolo, Ruchunda, and Kalungu. A joint MONUSCO and OHCHR investigation documented at least 135 cases of rapes, including of minors, and other acts of sexual violence perpetrated in a
systematic manner and with extreme violence by FARDC soldiers. To date, the government’s investigation is continuing. Twelve unit commanders have been suspended and two FARDC soldiers arrested in relation to the investigations. According to an FARDC intelligence officer and a local NGO, the commanders of the units in the area lost control over their units as they retreated from North Kivu. Given the large number of soldiers present at the time in the area, it is a challenge to identify which soldiers, and which units, were responsible for the rapes. The Group obtained a list of the commanders who were suspended following the attack. Most of them belong to the 8th Military Region (North Kivu).

Mai-Mai Morgan

133. Morgan’s group has been responsible for rape, sexual slavery, and sexual mutilation (see para. 76). The Group mentioned previously that between 1 and 5 November 2012 alone, Morgan’s group raped or sexually mutilated more than 150 women (see para. 76). During its March 2013 visit to Ituri, the Group interviewed separately 20 former Morgan combatants
and escaped or liberated abductees. Among them, seven were women, who told the Group they were forced to become “wives” of various militia members.

134. In late 2012, Morgan abducted other women during attacks on villages and gold mines. Former abductees told the Group that Morgan’s soldiers beat the women they hold captive, which is corroborated by images obtained by the Group.

135. Former abductees and UN sources report that Morgan had 50-60 abducted women with him in January 2013 when he attacked Mambasa town (see para. 73). Some of these women managed to escape.

Attacks on MONUSCO and Humanitarian Workers

136. Since the beginning of the Group’s mandate, there have been numerous attacks onMONUSCO peacekeepers and staff – in violation of the sanctions regime and onhumanitarian workers. In one case, unknown gunmen killed a Pakistani peacekeeper on 7 May 2013 near Bukavu, South Kivu. Following are examples of other, large-scale attacks.


137. On 20 November 2012, demonstrators in Kisangani (Orientale Province) protesting M23’s capture of Goma attacked two MONUSCO facilities. The Headquarters suffered only minor damage, but protestors caused more extensive damage at the Logistics Base, including the destruction of four vehicles and the main gate (see annex 64).


138. On 20-21 November 2012 in Bunia (Ituri District, Orientale Province), PNC andFARDC organized the looting of more than three-dozen facilities belonging to MONUSCO, various United Nations agencies, and international humanitarian organizations, as well as residences of UN and humanitarian staff (see annex 65). Eyewitnesses in Bunia and a report by the District of Ituri specifically identified Col. Willy Bonane Habarugira (see annex 66), FN29 who was acting commander of FARDC forces in the Safisha Operational Zone (Ituri), as having organized and participated in the ransacking of UN and humanitarian facilities. In addition, eyewitnesses told the Group that Colonel Juvénal Bideko (see annex 66), then Chief of the Police Nationale Congolaise (PNC) in Bunia, also organized looting of UN andhumanitarian compounds. Following the attacks, military authorities arrested ten PNC and 3 FARDC personnel. The Military Tribunal in Bunia convicted 5 PNC and 1 FARDC of pillaging; however, the government has brought no charges against either Col. Bideko or Col. Bonane despite their well-known roles in the pillaging.

29 In 2009, the U.S. Government rejected Col. Bonane for participation in a U.S.-run military training course dueto his poor human rights record.


139. On 23 March 2013, Republican Guard and FARDC soldiers shot at the MONUSCO Headquarters in Lubumbashi after a group of Kata Katanga entered the compound (see paras. 88 and annex 67). The attack caused minor damage to MONUSCO facilities and a PNC post next to the compound’s back gate.

Child soldiers

140. The Group investigated cases of recruitment of children in Katanga, North Kivu,Orientale, and South Kivu provinces. The Group interviewed 23 former child soldiers,between 8 and 17 years old. It also interviewed 34 former combatants who witnessed the presence of children in their armed groups. In addition, the Group received information from the MONUSCO Child Protection Section (CPS), and other partners. On the basis of the data
it collected, and in furtherance to paragraph 3 of resolution 2078 (2012), the Group notes that sanctioned individual Col. Innocent Kaina of M23 remains engaged in the recruitment of children.


141. The Group continues to collect data and analyze trends on recruitment of children by armed groups. The Group has confirmed that between January and May 2013, armed groups in eastern DRC have recruited at least 200 children. MONUSCO (CPS) documented that during the first four months of 2013, armed groups recruited 183 children, including 36 girls. Of these children, most were recruited and served in North Kivu (82), with the rest split between South Kivu (28), Katanga (38), and Orientale (35). Between January and April 2013, the CPS recorded 641 cases of children escaping from various armed groups, of which 109 were girls. Of the total, most children were originally from North Kivu (314), while others hailed from Katanga (79) Orientale (157), South Kivu (78), Rwanda (11), Central African Republic (1), and Sudan (1).


142. Desertions within M23 have been on the increase (see para.11). While M23 denies recruiting children, between January and April 2013, CPS identified 33 boys who deserted from M23, aged between 15 and 17 (see annex 68). Out of the 33, 11 had been recruited in Rwanda. In addition, the Group interviewed nine M23 deserters who confirmed that some children had escaped and returned directly to their families without surrendering to
authorities, confirming that there are undocumented cases of child soldier desertions.According to these sources, this practice has been more common among deserters who had been recruited in Rwanda and who seek to directly return home.

143. M23 continued to carry out forced recruitment within its area of operation in an effort to compensate for the desertions. Four former child soldiers told the Group how an unknown man had captured them while they were herding cows in Chanzu. This man then handed them over to two anonymous men, who delivered them to Col. Innocent Kaina at Rumangabo. The children subsequently served Kaina as cooks.

144. The Group also interviewed seven adult former combatants who had been recruited in Rwanda; these men stated that recruiters had promised them and some children “lucrative jobs in Congo”, but instead they were delivered to M23. These sources also disclosed that they had been recruited in Rwanda’s Nkamira Refugee Camp and the villages of Mizingo, Bigogwe, Byumba, and Nkuri. They added that while training in Rumangabo they had met other recruits who came from Kitotoma, Gitega, Musanze (Ruhengeri), Kichumbi, Rukomo and Gisenyi town in Rwanda. The Group also interviewed nine M23 deserters and 24 civilians in Kiwanja, Kanyaruchinya, Rutshuru town and Bunagana who also confirmed cases of forced recruitment of children in their communities.


145. According to 23 ex-FDLR combatants interviewed by the Group, FDLR has beenattempting to recruit children among the Rwandan refugee population in DRC, and among Congolese Hutu populations, but with limited success. The Group interviewed 15 children who escaped from the FDLR and who had all been forcibly recruited. One 16-year-old boy, born to FDLR parents told the Group he had automatically become a FDLR soldier when he was thirteen.

Kata Katanga

146. MONUSCO and UNICEF separated 45 children from the group of 242 Kata Katanga members who sought refuge at the MONUSCO base following their 23 March 2013 protest march through Lubumbashi (see para. 88 and annex 69). UNICEF separated an additional 30 children from the group upon its arrival at Ndolo military prison in Kinshasa. The Group is continuing to investigate reports that Kata Katanga and other armed groups in Katanga Province are recruiting children.

Raia Mutomboki

147. Raia Mutomboki remains the most geographically widespread armed group in North and South Kivu, with a high rate of recruitment and use of children (see S/2012/348, para. 181). The Group estimates that 25-30 percent of RM combatants are children. In 2012, a local NGO in Walikale territory assisted 415 former RM child soldiers (aged 8 to 15 years old) to reintegrate into their communities. By May 2013, the same NGO was in the process of reintegrating an additional 310 children.

Mai-Mai Morgan

148. During its investigation in Orientale, the Group interviewed five eyewitnesses whotestified to the presence of at least 15 children serving with Mai Mai Morgan (see para 78).


149. The Group is also investigating cases involving the illegal detention and use of children for military purposes by the FARDC. According to FARDC and MONUSCO sources as well as local authorities in the Kisala area of Butembo territory, between February and April 2013, FARDC’s 1032nd Battalion arrested four boys aged between 15 and 17 on charges of belonging to the Nyatura rebel group. An FARDC Major subsequently enlisted three of them as cooks, while assigning the fourth to be a soldier in Mushaki with the 106th Regiment commanded by Col. Civiri.

150. In April, UNICEF separated 19 children from the FARDC 812th Regiment located at Camp Bobozo in Kananga, in Kasai Occidental province. The Regiment had rotated from North Kivu to Kananga in March, and had forcefully recruited the children before their departure from North Kivu. Four soldiers from this Regiment acknowledged to the Group that they had been aware of the presence of the minors (commonly referred to as ‘kadogo’) in their ranks. In April, UNICEF separated two minors (one of them a girl) from the same Regiment; both had been forcefully recruited.


151. In pursuance of resolution 2078 (2012), the Group is investigating the involvement of armed groups and the FARDC in the illegal exploitation and illicit trade of naturalresources, FN30 as well as the impact of due diligence measures. The Group is focusing on minerals such as gold, tin, tantalum, tungsten, as well as on ivory, and is documenting,whenever possible, the commodity chains of these resources from local to internationalmarkets.

152. In its 2012 final report, the Group discussed how tin, tantalum and tungsten (3Ts)recorded exports from eastern DRC had nearly ceased (see S/2012/843, paras. 159-181), apart from north Katanga where mineral tagging was introduced in 2011. Partly as a consequence of the low production and prices of the 3Ts, most armed groups have shifted to exploiting gold, which is easier to smuggle, has a high value per volume, and has almost no due diligence oversight.

153. As companies proved reluctant to purchase untagged minerals from eastern DRC, local traders continue buying at lower prices for untagged minerals. These traders also deal in minerals coming from conflict zones and engage in smuggling across borders to neighboring countries. As one exporter explained to the Group: “as long as nobody is buying from DRC, there will be smuggling to neighboring countries”. Smuggling not only undermines due diligence efforts aimed at stamping out conflict minerals in DRC, but also jeopardizes traceability schemes within DRC and neighboring countries, as it negatively affects the perception of exports from the whole region.

154. The Group notes, however, positive initiatives in eastern DRC to monitor cases ofconflict minerals and smuggling. For instance, in North Kivu, the Follow-up Committee on Mining Activities (Comité de suivi des activités minières) monitors cases of smuggling and illegal imposition of taxes, and maps out mines occupied by armed groups.


155. Despite some progress, significant obstacles remain. In particular, the Group notes the on-going tension between organizations or individuals committed to expand due diligence, on the one hand, and individuals, notably in the armed forces, who continue to be involved in the sector through illegal taxation or smuggling. The DRC government must address the issue of FARDC complicity, criminality and impunity if it aims to convince the international community that it genuinely wants to legalize and formalize the minerals sector.

A – Gold trade

156. In accordance with paragraph 15 of resolution 2078 (2012), the Security Councilencouraged all States, particularly those in the region, to continue to raise awareness of the Group of Experts due diligence guidelines, particularly in the gold sector. In 2013, artisanal gold production remains important in eastern DRC, while due diligence efforts in the sector are still minimal.

157. Gold is still mostly smuggled along the routes identified in previous Group of Experts reports and by the same players (see S/2012/843). However, traders complained to the Group that the sharpest drop in gold prices in 30 years on the international market has negatively affected the trade. The presence of armed groups at some mines has also negatively impacted the trade, as miners and traders faced growing insecurity at mine sites.

1- Without official trade, nearly no due diligence

158. Two gold traders, local officials, and civil society representatives in Bunia stated that gold production in Ituri has not declined in recent years; in fact, it may have increased as the price of gold increased dramatically after 2007. Yet gold traders and Congolese government authorities informed the Group that during 2012, only 16.17 kg of gold was legally exported from Ituri.

159. In North Kivu, the government did not register any gold comptoir during the first five months of 2013, and there has been no recorded export of gold during this same period. AR Gold, an export house based in Goma (S/2012/843, para. 185), exported 10.15 kg of gold from Lubero in November 2012 to its own branch in Dubai, but did not renew its export
house license in 2013 (see annex 70). Glory Minerals (S/2008/773, para. 97; S/2009/603, para. 128-136, 156 and 307), the other gold export house operating in North Kivu during 2012 also failed to register in 2013.

160. During 2012, businessmen exported only 39 kg of gold from South Kivu. According to official mining statistics, between January to May 2013, Mining Congo exported 27.7 kg of gold to Dubai. Local authorities, miners, and businessmen informed the Group that production is on the order of several tons a year in South Kivu. Consequently, the Group continues to investigate the smuggling of gold from South Kivu.

2- Gold smuggling

161. The Group notes that nearly all gold smuggling continues to follow the same path from eastern DRC through Kampala and Bujumbura, and involving largely the same networks, as documented in previous Group of Experts reports (see S/2012/843, para. 188-193).

162. According to two gold traders and local authorities in Ituri, most gold from Ituricontinues to be exported to Uganda, where it is purchased by Rajendra “Raju” Vaya of the sanctioned entity Machanga Ltd (see S/2012/843, para. 183), while a small amount(particularly from Mambasa territory) goes to Butembo before being smuggled to Uganda. Despite numerous testimonies from gold dealers, local officials, and civil society
representatives in Ituri and North Kivu that virtually all gold produced in these areas isexported to and traded in Kampala, the Government of Uganda told the Group it officially exported only 286 kg of gold during 2012 (see annex 71).

163. During its April 2013 visit to Burundi, Burundian mining authorities informed theGroup that there is currently no traceability in the gold sector in Burundi. They also declared that while trafficking of minerals across borders is taking place, they have not made any seizure in 2013. However, they explained that plans for traceability schemes, including for gold, are being considered. In March 2013, the President of Burundi imposed a 2-month ban on mining activities, with a view to formalizing the artisanal mining sector. Authorities confirmed to the Group that a new gold refinery in Cibitoke will refine all Burundian gold before exportation. The Group notes that between 1 January and 31 March 2013, 552.4 kg of gold had been exported from Burundi (see annex 72).

3- Conflict gold

164. In its 2012 final report, the Group concluded that criminal networks within the FARDC and armed groups profit from the production and trade of gold (see S/2012/843, paras. 185- 187). The Group has documented that armed groups continued to be involved in the production and trade of gold during the first half of 2013.

165. The 10th Military Region of FARDC controls the Mukungwe gold mine, in Walungu territory, South Kivu (see S/2011/738, paras. 528-532). At this site, FARDC soldiers collect illegal taxes weekly from artisanal miners. Miners who fail to pay are arrested and held in an underground prison until payment of the tax is made. The Group obtained an October 2012 letter from the president of one of Mukungwe’s local cooperatives that reminded the local army intelligence officer that the weekly tax of 1000FC (USD 1.11) per miner needs to be split between the ANR, the police and the army (see annex 73). A former FDLR officer in charge of logistics told the Group that the FDLR also collected taxes from miners working in Mukungwe, as well as in Rukatu mine, in Mwenga territory; FDLR accrues USD 2000 per month from both mines.

166. According to a former FDLR officer and gold traders in Butembo, the FDLR areinvolved in gold mining in North Kivu’s Lubero Territory. According to several formerFDLR combatants, FDLR commanders are also drawing profits from gold mines in Walikale. In some instances, FDLR combatants search for gold themselves, and in other cases, they tax gold miners, demanding their production one day per week.

167. In Walikale territory, local authorities told the Group that Raia Mutomboki elements are present at gold mines in Bakano, while Mai Mai Simba are at mines near Osso river. Mai Mai Sheka is benefiting from taxes on almost one hundred mining sites in Walikale, some of them previously controlled by Raia Mutomboki.

168. In Orientale, several miners told the Group that Mai Mai Morgan’s modus operandi is to attack gold mines, such as Pangoy, Ilota and Itembo sites, every 3 days to 2 weeks, and rob miners of some of their gold (see para. 77-78).

B- Tin, tantalum and tungsten trade

1- Production and trade trend

169. In 2013, the production and exports of 3Ts varied greatly among provinces. In Maniema, mining authorities recorded a gradual increase in tin exports, but no tantalum or tungsten exports. In North Kivu, mining authorities told the Group they had no official tin or tungsten exports, but that tantalum production and exports had significantly increased. In South Kivu, only exports of tin were recorded.

170. Several factors explain the differences in 3T exports. First, as a consequence of Section 1502 of the July 2010 Dodd Frank Act, many companies simply ceased purchasing minerals from the Great Lakes region. Secondly, from 1 April 2011 onwards, smelters and refineries seeking conflict-free smelter status from the Electronics Industry Citizenship Coalition started processing minerals tagged exclusively by ITRI Tin Supply Chain Initiative (iTSCi). The iTSCi scheme has superseded other approaches towards carrying out due diligence. The prospect of legal sale for untagged minerals is therefore limited. Only a handful of companies
on the international market are willing to purchase untagged Congolese minerals, whichexplains the low level of exports from some provinces in eastern DRC. Thirdly, progresstowards expanding traceability schemes such as iTSCi remained slow in North and South Kivu, partly due to the volatile security situation in the area.

171. In Maniema Province, Governor Tutu Salumu Pascal has taken actions that havepositively impacted legal trade in tin and increased provincial revenues. On 26 February2013, in a bid to fight trafficking, the Governor reinforced the Congolese Mining Minister’s verbal order banning the export of minerals from Maniema to North and South Kivu by air by signing an official letter to that effect. This encouraged the legal export of minerals to Kindu, the capital of Maniema, from where exporters can legally ship tin ore by train to Kalemie (Katanga province), and on to the Tanzanian port of Dar Es Salaam.

172. Following this air transport export ban, the provincial government recorded an increase in revenues from legally traded minerals, partly due to this measure, and the start of tagging tin ore in the province. Production for the period January to May 2013 increased to 576 metric tons, which were exported to China, Hong Kong and Panama. However, in the absence of tagging, no other mineral was exported from Maniema.

173. In North Kivu, production and exportation differed depending on the type of mineral. Due to the ban on air transport of minerals from Maniema through North and South Kivu, and the absence of tagging and validation at North Kivu’s main tin mine of Bisie, there was no export of tin ore between January and April 2013. During the same period in 2012, companies had exported a total of 485 metric tons of tin ore. Production in the province continued in 2013, however.

174. In late May 2013, the Group observed people bagging minerals when it visited thevillage of Njingala, near Bisie mine (see annex 74). It counted 12 bags, each weighing 50 kg; i.e. 600kg of tin ore. While most Bisie production is consigned and stored, some of the current production is being smuggled (see below smuggling section). North Kivu exporters told the Group they are anxious for a prompt validation of Bisie and other mines so that they can re-start the tin trade. Regarding production and export of tantalum, mining authorities recorded an increase in 2013. Between January and April, companies exported 47.4 metric tons of tantalum ore from North Kivu to the companies Tolead Group and Guilin Jinli New Chemical Materials, in China; during the same period in 2012, exports totaled 21.2 metric tons.

175. South Kivu is home to the only validated mine in the Kivus where tagging is takingplace. For the first three months of 2013, exports from South Kivu amounted to 190 metric tons of tin ore; tagged minerals represent the majority of these exports. Other validated and non-validated mines in South Kivu do not have tagging. While there was continuing
production in Walungu, Shabunda, Mwenga, and Idjwi territories, amongst other sites, the province did not record any export of tantalum and tungsten between January and March 2013. In 2013, the local price for tungsten continued to decline, from USD 9 per kg in July 2012 to USD 6.5 in May 2013 (see S/2012/843, para. 228). However, between February and May 2013, miners on Idjwi Island (in Lake Kivu) produced 491 metric tons of tungsten, which was later purchased and stored by local traders. During its visit in late May to Idjwi, the Group received information regarding continuing smuggling from the island to nearby ports (see S/2012/843, para. 163).

2-Due diligence efforts in DRC

a- Integrating the Note circulaire’s due diligence requirements into companies’ policies

176. On 3 March 2013, the Ministry of Mines reinstated the rights of Congo Minerals and Metals (CMM) and Huaying, which had been prohibited from exporting in 2012 (see S/2012/348, paras. 141-142). These companies have since opened offices in Kindu and Bukavu. While Huaying continues exporting untagged minerals extracted from non-validated mines in Maniema and South Kivu, CMM has signed a protocol agreement on 11 validated tin mines in Maniema. The owners of both CMM and Huyiang have made a written pledge to implement due diligence procedures (see annex 75).

177. Following the reopening of the processing companies, the Minister of Minesunsuccessfully called for a mission of certification and validation of Bisie mine in Walikaleterritory of North Kivu, which would allow minerals to be purchased and exported (see annex 78). In the interim, in the absence of certification of the mine, the ministerial ban on sale of Bisie minerals remains in place. The question of the minerals stocks from Bisie also persists. After the suspension in May 2012, the provincial mining authorities set up a Commission of Verification of Stocks (Commission de vérification des stocks). In July 2012, and in February and June 2013, the Commission registered the number of bags of red tin ore and black tin ore held by each négociant in Mubi, Njingala and Makana, to ensure that already stored minerals were not sold, moved, or smuggled (see annex 76). However, during the first registration, the Commission did not record the number of bags, only the total weight, and did not number the bags (see annex 77). The Group was informed of the practice of replacing bags of tin ore with bags full of reject materials, so that the tin ore can be sold and the stocks look unchanged to inspectors.

178. On 22 May 2013, aware of this ongoing problem of movement of bags and theconfusion it created, local authorities took the decision to stop any movement of bags from Bisie mine to the village of Njingala, where minerals are stored or transported to Goma. On 27 May, in a letter to the Congolese Minister of Mines, the governor of North Kivu, Julien Paluku, requested authorization to release all the minerals stored in the village of Mubi (see annex 78). No decision on this request has been made prior to this report’s publication. The Group continues to monitor smuggling and due diligence efforts in North Kivu.

179. In South Kivu, mining authorities also noted the challenges in expanding andstrengthening due diligence, as the majority of the actors in the mining sector in the province are refusing to get involved in due diligence and traceability efforts. In April 2013, the Group met miners at the tin ore mine of Zola-zola, near Nzibira in Walungu territory. The miners told the Group that SAESCAM31 had sensitized them about the issues of conflict minerals and child labor at mining sites. However, the miners complained that as long as the mine is not validated and there is no tagging, they will have difficulties selling their minerals. To address some of their demands, the Trading Counter project is being restarted FN32.

b- The progressive development of validation, tagging and certification

180. The cautious approach to expand validation and tagging throughout the Kivus resulted in impatience amongst the artisanal mining community, which is the sole producer of 3Ts. In some areas, the government has successfully demilitarized mining zones, notably in parts of South Kivu, thus creating a situation favorable to the validation of several mines in the province. In June 2013, a new program of validation started in South Kivu, with plans to expand during the last quarter of 2013 in Maniema.

181. There are 11 validated “green” mines in North Kivu, including 8 tantalum ore mines, but no tagging process. In April 2013, CMM started exporting tantalum again from North Kivu, and sent 39 metric tons to Tolead Group Limited in Hong Kong. In April 2013, AMR Mugote also started exporting tantalum from the “green” site at Bibatama to mainland China.

31 Service d’assistance et d’encadrement du Small Scale Mining

32 In 2011, the DRC government and MONUSCO started a parallel and complementary system of traceability of minerals through the validations of mining areas and the creation of trading counters (Centres de Négoces) in North and South Kivu.

182. Following the Government’s validation in July 2012 of six mines surrounding theKalimbi mine in Nyabibwe in South Kivu as “green”, tagging started in Nyabibwe in October 2012. In addition to tagging at the mine, a good step in itself towards traceability, only one processing company in Bukavu, World Mining Company (WMC), purchases these minerals, further simplifying the supply chain. Pact, the non-governmental organization in charge of the tagging, tags minerals from T20 and Koweit mines at the Kalimbi mine site. WMC purchases the minerals from two local cooperatives, and then sells them to Traxys in Belgium. FN33

183. In April 2013, the Group visited the mining sites at Nyabibwe. Prices at the mines were between USD 3 per kilo for raw minerals and USD 5 for washed minerals. While this price was lower than past prices, miners told the Group that the buyers prefer to buy in Kalimbi than at other mines in the area because of the demand for tagged and “well-traced” minerals on the international market.

184. In July 2012 in Maniema Province, the Joint Validation Team headed by MONUSCO and the Maniema Ministry of Mines qualified 20 mining sites in Kailo and Punia territories as “conflict free”. The Congolese Minister of Mines further validated the 20 sites on 19 October (see annex 79). On 17 December 2012, the provincial government officially authorized tagging in Kailo and Kalima, two centers of tin production. Maniema Mining Company SPRL (MMC) (a Malaysia Smelting Corporation-led (MSC) consortium and a member of ITRI34) is currently the sole processing entity buying minerals from Kailo and Kalima. By May 2013, MMC had 100 tons of tin ore in stock from 11 mining sites, and was planning to export by the end of May.

185. On 12 April, as minerals from 9 out 20 of the validated mines were not receiving tags, the provincial Minister of Mines banned comptoirs from purchasing minerals from these nine sites (see annex 80). On 9 June, the Congolese Minister of Mines visited Kindu and reiterated the Governor’s ban on purchase of minerals from the nine mines and promised that the validation process for the remaining non-validated mines would begin soon.

c- Certification

186. The Group is also closely following the implementation of the ICGLR RegionalCertification Mechanism.35 This mechanism intents to address the illicit trade of minerals at the regional level by “providing sustainable conflict free mineral supply chains,” notably with the delivery of ICGLR Certificates for satisfactory compliance with due diligence guidelines (see annex 81). Such a scheme could partly address smuggling issues as there are safeguards built in to the system such as the regional tracking of mineral flows via the ICGLR Database,36 regular independent third party audits, and creation of an independent Mineral Chain Auditor. Minerals from different mines could also be identified through the German Office for Geosciences and Natural Resources (BGR) system of fingerprinting. FN37 BGR has a database where minerals from different mines in the DRC and Rwanda have been analyzed and their chemical fingerprint stored in the database.

33 See S/2008/773, para.88

34 International Tin Research Institute



3- Continued smuggling

187. The Group has confirmed that smuggling of minerals continues within and from eastern DRC. Miners, traders, local residents, and civil society representatives have told the Group that businessmen smuggle minerals by cooperating with corrupt mining and military authorities. The Group has documented smuggling from Maniema province to Bukavu (South Kivu) and Goma, and from Bisie to Goma and Bukavu. The Group intends to continue investigating this matter, to investigate the networks that facilitate smuggling, and to follow commodity chains through neighbouring countries to international markets.

188. In spite of measures taken by various provincial authorities, the Group was informed during its visits to Maniema and Walikale provinces at the end of May 2013 that smuggling of minerals from Maniema to North and South Kivu continues. Négociants smuggle tantalum ore from Punia and Kasese to Bukavu in South Kivu. They give USD 2 to the local authorities at the airports in Kindu and Bukavu for every kilogram of tantalum ore they
export. They also smuggle minerals from Maniema by road to Goma via Walikale, or viaWalikale through Hombo-Bunyakiri to Bukavu, all with the complicity of some militaryofficers and the local mine agents.

189. At Bisie, where minerals cannot be bought legally, négociants from Goma and Bukavu are exploiting the situation and buying tin ore at a low price (USD 2 per kg). Smugglers work with some of the local civil and military authorities to move the minerals by road to Goma or Bukavu. They transport minerals at night in military vehicles to avoid the checkpoints in Njingala. They then move the minerals to civilian vehicles. The Group documented two incidents of illegal transport of minerals from Bisie in the course of the last two weeks of May. In addition, on 7 June 2013, Goma police seized 1.3 metric tons of tin coming from Walikale (see annex 82). Various governmental authorities complained to the Group about the smuggling by the FARDC, and its detrimental impact on the possible validation of Bisie.

190. During its field mission to Idjwi in May, the Group documented cases of smuggling of tungsten to Goma and Gisenyi, indicating that smuggling continues as documented in the Group’s final report of 2012 (see S/2012/843, para 163). According to local mining agents, miners and ANR38 agents, the smuggling is facilitated by local military and naval force. On the night of 13-14 April 2013, a boat smuggling 3 tons of tungsten from Idjwi (Nord) towards Goma capsized on Lake Kivu.


38 Agence nationale de renseignements

4- Efforts to tackle smuggling in the region

Seizures in Burundi

191. During its official visit to Burundi in April 2013, Burundian customs agents showed the Group bags of minerals they had seized in 2012 (see annex 83). The customs agents informed the Group that they seized 10-20 tons of tin ore from traffickers in 2012 at the border with DRC, and at the port of Bujumbura.

Seizures in Rwanda

192. In a letter to the Group dated 7 June 2013, Rwandan mining authorities told the Group that they had seized 8.4 metric tons of minerals in 2012 and are in the process of handing over the minerals to the DRC authorities. They stated they would be working with the DRC “to devise together means of curbing this smuggling”. The authorities informed the Group they have not seized any minerals from the DRC between January and May 2013.

Seizures in Uganda

193. On 14 May 2013, Ugandan mining authorities told the Group that during 2013, they had not seized any illegal tin, tungsten, or tantalum coming from the DRC.

5- Conflict 3Ts

194. The Group has confirmed that armed groups are still controlling mines and illegallytaxing the trade in minerals. In particular, the Group documented the activities of RaiaMutomboki in South Kivu. Local authorities and NGOs informed the Group that different factions of Raia Mutomboki control several 3Ts mines in Kalehe and Shabunda territories.
The Group continues to investigate the involvement of Raia Mutomboki and other armedgroups in the production and trade of the 3Ts.

195. During its March 2013 visit to Shabunda in South Kivu, the Group confirmed RaiaMutomboki’s control over 3T mines and strategic locations in the territory. In October 2012, Raia Mutomboki troops had attacked the FARDC base in Lulingu. Though the rebels sustained heavy casualties, they took control of Lulingu airstrip, the usual exit route for minerals from Shabunda. The Governor of South Kivu responded by banning the use of the Lulingu airstrip. Minerals from Raia Mutomboki-controlled zones which were formerly airlifted from Lulingu to Bukavu were henceforth transported by porters and motorbikes to Shabunda for transportation by air to Bukavu.

196. In March 2013, the Group witnessed the loading of tin ore from Lulingu and other mines into airplanes at the Shabunda airstrip for transportation to Bukavu (see annex 84). The Mines agents issue official documents without properly ascertaining the origin of the minerals. The Group also documented how Raia Mutomboki fought FARDC in November
2012 in order to stop their deployments in tantalum and tin-rich mines in Kigulube. Inaddition, sources in the mining sector, local administration and civil society in Kinduconfirmed to the Group that Raia Mutomboki stole minerals during a February 2013 attack on Kasese, and sold them to négociants in Goma.

197. The Group was also informed that Raia Mutomboki is levying taxes on trading roads in Shabunda and Kalehe territories. The Group obtained notes from a Raia Mutomboki meeting in February 2013 listing four checkpoints in Shabunda where the armed group taxes all vehicles and goods, including minerals. Mining authorities separately informed the Group that Raia Mutomboki levies a tax of half a kilogram of minerals per 50 kg bag at checkpoints on key trading roads in Shabunda territory. Near Hombo, Raia Mutomboki also taxes USD 5 per bag of tin ore carried on motorbikes from Walikale on the Walikale-Bukavu road. FARDC and other Congolese services are also levying illegal taxes on this road.

C – Ivory

198. The Group has confirmed that ivory poaching is taking place in many areas of eastern DRC Congo, especially in Virunga National Park, Maiko National Park, the Okapi Fauna Reserve, and Garamba National Park. The Group observed ivory in North Kivu and Orientale that local craftspeople had made into scrimshaw or jewelry (see annex 85), but conservationists and Congolese authorities told the Group that most ivory is exported raw through neighboring countries.

199. The Government of Uganda reported eight seizures of ivory between 1 January and 16 September 2012 (see annex 86), but reported no seizures between 17 September 2012 and 14 May 2013. The origin of the seized ivory is unclear, but former poachers, ex-combatants, and local leaders in eastern DRC have told the Group that Uganda is the most common transit country or destination for poached ivory from northeast DRC.

200. Ex-combatants and local leaders in North Kivu’s Grand Nord told the Group that ivory poached in Virunga National Park is traded in Butembo, Beni, and Kasindi. A prominent purchaser of ivory is Muhindo Kasebere, a businessman from Butembo who lives in Kasindi, on the border with Uganda. Congolese authorities arrested Kasebere in March 2013 for supporting militia groups allied to URDC (para. 62), but following his release two days later, Kasebere fled to Uganda, where former URDC combatants and Congolese authorities told the Group he is currently residing.

201. A former poacher and local authorities told the Group that in exchange for ivory,Kasebere gave Hilaire’s militias arms, money, or supplies, depending on the militia’s desires. The poacher told the Group that Kasebere paid him $90 per kilogram for ivory. The same sources mentioned above stated that Kasebere obtained arms and ammunition from sources in
Uganda, and that Kasebere coordinated his smuggling with political and military officials in Kasese District (Uganda).

VII – Recommendations

202. The Group of Experts makes the following recommendations:

To the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004)concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo:

203. The Committee to renew its commitment to consider recommendations of the Group of Experts proposing the designation of specific individuals and entities for targeted sanctions;

To Member States of the Great Lakes region:

204. The eleven signatories of the Framework Agreement (S/2013/131) to respect theaccord’s obligations, in particular the commitment of the Government of the DemocraticRepublic of Congo to continue and deepen security sector reform with respect to the Army and Police;

205. Member States of the region to refrain from harboring sanctioned individuals orproviding protection of any kind to persons falling under the sanctions regime, in accordance with the Framework Agreement;

206. The member States of the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries(ECGLC/CEPGL) – Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda – to revive the extradition provisions of their tripartite convention;

207. Member States to promote regional integration through the development of mutually benefiting infrastructure, and to guide and monitor private initiatives in this regard in a transparent manner, with a view to safeguarding the interests of all parties;

208. The Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, acting with the support ofinternational partners, to clarify the status of M23 surrenderers to the MONUSCO DDRRR programme who declare that they are Rwandan nationals, and address the problem of the repatriation of these ex-combatants to Rwanda;

To the Government of the DRC:

209. The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to expand validationmissions to mining sites where such missions have not taken place to date, including Nzibira and Bisie, as soon as the security situation allows;

210. The Military Prosecutor’s office to investigate and prosecute all military personnelinvolved in the trade of natural resources, as well as individuals and entities supporting these criminal networks within the Congolese armed forces;

211. The Government to appoint a “Special Envoy” to be in charge of negotiations withspecific rebel groups, to facilitate demobilisation and possible integration in the FARDC;

212. The Government to cease its in situ integration of armed groups in the FARDCwithout proper vetting;

To the Government of Rwanda:

213. The Government of Rwanda to submit to the Committee, copying the Group ofExperts, a list of the remaining former M23 combatants who crossed into Rwanda during 2013;

214. The Government of Rwanda to investigate and prosecute individuals supporting M23 activities on its territory;

To the Government of Uganda:

215. The Government of Uganda to demonstrate a renewed commitment to restructuring its gold trade sector and combat gold smuggling, and inform the Committee regarding progress achieved.