Uganda is redefining its role in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) by massively increasing its military presence. As M23 rebels and Rwandan forces advance in strategic areas of North Kivu, Kampala is deploying troops and logistical support to secure control over the region, officially to contain M23’s expansion.
General Muhoozi Kainerugaba, commander of the Ugandan People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) and son of President Yoweri Museveni, has recently made controversial statements on X (formerly Twitter), declaring that Uganda controls the entire DRC border north of Lubero and that “nothing will happen there without our permission.” He also delineated Rwanda’s sphere of influence, claiming it ends 20 kilometers south of Lubero, implicitly setting a red line against Kigali.
While Muhoozi appears to assert Uganda’s military dominance along the DRC border, he maintains an ambiguous relationship with Kigali. He recently declared that “Uganda and Rwanda are one forever” and announced plans to sign a defense pact with Kagame, stating that an attack on one of the two countries would be considered a declaration of war on both.
At the same time, Congolese sources report a massive deployment of Ugandan forces in North Kivu, particularly in Butembo and Lubero, with reinforcements in both personnel and heavy equipment. According to security sources, the UPDF is setting up a defensive line to block M23’s expansion toward Butembo and Beni, suggesting that Uganda could militarily oppose the rebel group’s advance.
However, Uganda has curiously avoided accusations of complicity with M23, even though the first M23 fighters entered the DRC in 2022 from Ugandan territory. This contradiction raises questions about Kampala’s real intentions: Is Uganda truly opposing M23, or is it simply seeking to redefine its sphere of influence against Rwanda?
Uganda’s increased military presence coincides with a strategic decision by the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA), outlined in an official memorandum dated March 3, 2025. This document, addressed to all Ugandan customs offices, redirects trade routes into the DRC and temporarily bans the transit of goods to Goma and Bukavu. The measure is justified by the loss of control of these cities by the Congolese government, which has led to significant revenue losses for both Congolese and Ugandan customs authorities.
According to the directive, Ugandan exports to the DRC must now pass through alternative border points, including Bunagana, Ishasha, Busanza, and Kyeshero, effectively blocking traditional trade routes through Katuna and Cyanika, which are key commercial corridors for Rwandan trade.
This decision raises critical questions. Is Uganda attempting to weaken Rwanda by diverting Congolese trade away from its usual routes, or is it merely protecting its own economic interests amid growing instability? This forced rerouting of trade could diminish Rwanda’s economic influence in the region while strengthening Uganda’s strategic position in eastern DRC.
While Muhoozi continues making contradictory statements on X, shifting between apparent support for Kigali and claims of Ugandan sovereignty over the DRC border, Uganda seems determined to play a central role in reshaping power dynamics in Ituri and North Kivu.
The key question remains: Is Uganda truly pushing back against Rwanda’s expansion in the DRC, or is it simply maneuvering to ensure Kampala remains an unavoidable power player in the Great Lakes region?
Therwandan
