Pierre Jacquemot, an experienced diplomat and academic, former French ambassador to Kenya, Ghana, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), honorary president of Groupe initiatives, member of the editorial board of Afrique contemporaine, and member of the Académie des sciences d’outre-mer, presents an in-depth analysis in his March 2025 study titled “Conflicts in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo: Greedy Neighbors, Armed Groups and Mining Predation”.
Since the 1990s, the eastern part of the DRC, especially the provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu, and Ituri, has experienced extreme violence. Jacquemot underscores that this violence is fundamentally linked to the region’s extraordinary mineral wealth. He uses the term “deadly extractivism” to illustrate how these minerals, though strategically important for economic development, paradoxically become a curse for local populations. The key resources involved are gold and the so-called “3T” minerals: coltan (tantalum), cassiterite (tin), and tungsten, which are crucial for modern technological industries.
Artisanal mining largely dominates production but is characterized by extreme precarity, widespread informality, and hazardous working conditions. Miners typically operate without permits, formal contracts, or medical protection, facing daily risks of accidents and various forms of violence. According to Jacquemot, the cooperatives intended to structure artisanal mining have intensified community conflicts rather than mitigating them, as these cooperatives are frequently controlled by political elites or influential customary authorities, thus exacerbating local ethnic and social rivalries.
The central role of minerals in conflicts is elaborated through their economic and strategic importance. Jacquemot emphasizes that roughly 98% of artisanal gold exits illegally from the country, depriving the Congolese state of significant tax revenues. Strategic minerals like coltan, essential for global electronics, are particularly sought after. Coltan is predominantly mined within a mineral corridor spanning approximately 700 kilometers across eastern Congo. Artisanal mining comprises the majority of production, with mines such as Manono, Kisengo, and Bibatama producing substantial quantities, often under the control of armed groups.
These numerous and diverse armed groups—estimated to exceed 120—use systematic violence to maintain control over mining sites. They impose illegal taxes at every stage of production and export, creating an informal mafia-like economy that sustains their operations and prolongs conflict. The national army (FARDC) itself actively participates in these predatory practices, despite official prohibitions against military presence in mining areas.
Jacquemot pays particular attention to the M23 militia, which resurfaced in 2021 with direct Rwandan support. This militia significantly strengthened Rwandan control over Congolese mineral resources by capturing the strategic cities of Goma and Bukavu in early 2025. Under M23 control, thousands of tons of minerals are illegally exported to Kigali, where they are laundered and sold internationally as Rwandan products. This process systematically deprives the DRC of critical revenues necessary for economic and social development.
Illegal mineral trafficking is facilitated via two primary corridors: the northern corridor through Uganda and the central corridor through Rwanda, leading to ports in Mombasa and Dar es Salaam. From there, minerals reach international markets in Europe, the United Arab Emirates, and Asia—particularly Malaysia and China. Jacquemot describes these trafficking routes as highly structured and efficient, involving local traders, international intermediaries, and well-established commercial centers. Burundi also plays a significant role due to lax customs controls and lower export taxes, particularly facilitating gold smuggling.
This predatory economic model perpetuates continuous structural violence, driven by individual and collective greed and marked by frequent armed confrontations over control of mining areas and trade routes. This situation leads to chronic instability and substantial human suffering.
International attempts to “moralize” mineral supply chains, such as “conflict-free” certifications, have shown mixed results. Jacquemot notes that these initiatives face numerous practical obstacles on the ground due to weak state institutions, rampant corruption, and powerful informal local networks.
To address these complex issues effectively, Jacquemot insists on adopting a systemic approach targeting the structural roots of the conflicts. He advocates for effective demilitarization of mining areas, sustainable economic and social reintegration of demobilized combatants, significant improvements in local and national governance, and the reinforcement of international mechanisms overseeing mineral trade.
Therwandan
