In late August 2024, between August 29 and 30, high-level intelligence officials from Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Angola met in Rubavu, Rwanda. The aim of this meeting was to discuss peace efforts for the eastern DRC, a region long troubled by instability, armed groups, and a complex geopolitical conflict involving Rwanda. After heated discussions, both Rwanda and the DRC reached a tentative agreement on the withdrawal of Rwandan troops from DRC soil and the disarmament of the FDLR (Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda), a rebel group operating in the region.
According to Africa Intelligence, a French publication, the meeting was a top-secret event aimed at finding a resolution to the ongoing war in the eastern DRC. It was chaired by Matias Bertino Matombo, head of Angola’s external intelligence services, who acted as a mediator. Representing Rwanda was Brigadier General Jean-Paul Nyirubutama, deputy head of the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS), and General Christian Ndaywel, the head of military intelligence in DRC. These leaders, along with Justin Inzun Kakiak, representing the DRC intelligence, discussed terms that were previously debated in Goma, DRC, ten days earlier.
The Rubavu meeting concluded with the three parties signing a report outlining security and peace in eastern DRC. This agreement detailed a 10-step process over 120 days, focusing primarily on weakening the FDLR and ensuring the withdrawal of Rwandan troops. It was agreed that both Rwandan and Congolese military and intelligence leaders would collaborate closely, exchanging information and evaluating progress.
According to the same Africa Intelligence report, the disarmament process would begin with at least five days of military operations conducted by the Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC), potentially supported by Rwandan troops, against the FDLR. Only after these military actions would Rwandan forces begin their withdrawal from the DRC. The Rwandan government’s self-imposed security measures would be lifted simultaneously, and the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of FDLR combatants into civilian life would follow.
However, skepticism remains over the true intentions behind these discussions. Rwanda has long used the presence of the FDLR in eastern DRC as justification for its military interventions in the area. Many analysts argue that Rwanda’s deeper goal is to maintain control over the region’s rich natural resources, especially valuable minerals, under the guise of security concerns. While Rwandan officials often declare victory over the FDLR, claiming that the rebel group no longer poses a significant threat to Rwanda, they continue to cite the group’s existence as a pretext for military presence.
A closer examination of Rwanda’s broader regional strategy reveals further complications. Another key issue ignored in the Rubavu talks was the M23 rebel group, which is widely believed to be supported by Rwanda. The M23, whose leaders have previously served in both the Rwandan army and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), shares ethnic ties with the Tutsi community in Rwanda, further blurring the lines between Rwandan national interests and regional rebel movements. Critics have pointed out that while the agreement mentions the withdrawal of Rwandan troops, it says nothing about M23, raising concerns that Rwanda may leave behind a proxy force even after its official troops withdraw.
Many observers question the feasibility of separating M23 fighters from the Rwandan military, as they speak the same language and belong to the same ethnic group. This raises further doubts about whether true peace can be achieved if Rwanda continues to influence events in eastern DRC through such indirect channels. To many analysts, the entire Rubavu meeting appears to be a diplomatic maneuver by Rwanda to deflect international scrutiny and maintain its strategic interests in the DRC while avoiding sanctions or other punitive measures.
It is also important to note that cooperation between the DRC and Rwanda on military matters is not new. Previous joint military operations, such as Umoja Wetu, Amani Leo, Kimya I and Kimya II, and Sokola I and Sokola II, all targeted the FDLR but failed to eradicate the group. Some analysts argue that Rwanda has no real interest in permanently resolving the FDLR issue and uses it as a convenient excuse to continue its involvement in the DRC. Rwanda’s past cooperation with the DRC government has included high-profile military actions, such as the killing of key FDLR leaders like General Sylvestre Mudacumura, General Afrika Janvier, and General Wilson Irategeka. Yet, Rwanda has continued to support M23, which remains active in the region.
On the diplomatic front, the DRC government has been vocal about its refusal to negotiate with M23 or engage with Rwanda on any matter other than the withdrawal of Rwandan forces. The fact that Rwanda has acknowledged the presence of its troops in the DRC, and that these troops are now expected to leave, is being hailed by some as a diplomatic victory for the DRC. Should this agreement fail to produce concrete results, the international community may view Rwanda as a destabilizing force in the region, potentially leading to sanctions or other diplomatic consequences.
The Rubavu agreement represents a potential step toward peace, but its success is far from guaranteed. The exclusion of M23 from the discussions raises serious questions about the long-term viability of any peace deal in the DRC, as does Rwanda’s ongoing involvement in the region’s affairs. Unless both Rwanda and the DRC can demonstrate genuine commitment to ending violence and stabilizing eastern DRC, the international community may hold Rwanda accountable for its actions. Given the high stakes, the next 120 days will be crucial in determining whether this agreement leads to lasting peace or yet another failed diplomatic effort in a region that has suffered from decades of instability.
